וואס @תוהו ובוהו מיינט איז טאמער נעמט מען אָן אז בחירה איז אן אינטרינסיק בּעיסיק טוב איז יש מקום לומר אז דאס זאל איבערוועגן די מציאות פון רעות וואס קומען ע״כ ארויס דערפון ע״י רוע בחירתן של אנשים - די מעגליכקייט וואס די ״טוב״ פון עצם בחירה ברענגט צו. (דר. עלווין פּלענטינגאַ איז א שטארקע דוגל פון דעם מהלך.) דאס איז וואס אנבאלאנגט רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד דורך די עידזשענסי פון א מענטש [סוג ב׳ וג׳ מהרעות שכלל הרמב״ם]. ולגבי די רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד מהטבע [סוג א׳], וואס די אגענט נעמט מען אָן עפ״י טעאיזם איז הקב״ה, אויב קומט דאס אויף רשעים קען מען דאס אויך פארשטיין ווייל דאס איז אויך א פועל יוצא פון די עצם ״טוב״ פון בחירה וואס מ׳האט אנגענומען כנ״ל; עס איז די עונש על רוע בחירתן. אויב אבער איז די סארט רעות על הצדיק דאן ווערט נולד די קשיא ווייל ער האט דאך יא גוט בוחר געווען.
זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
4571 פאסטס אין ארכיוו · אשכול #191
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תוהו ובוהוווען אין ספרי קודש שטייט ''גוט'' מיינט דאס גוט פארוועם עס קומט זיך, אין אנדערע ווערטער; ס'גייט בשילוב מיט ''צדיק''..
איי געס די שאלה איז נאר אויב מ'איז מגדיר ''גוט'' איינער וואס וויל נאר גורם זיין הנאה.. (וואס איז א לכאורה א סתירה מיט צדיק).
כ'ווייס נישט ווי דו האסט געטראפן אזא גאט, אין ספרי קודש לכאורה נישט, אין ספרי קודש געפינען מיר א אלמעכטיגער גאט וואס באגיסט זיינע פריינט (צדיקים?) מיט רעגן אין ניצחון, און אינטערדרוקט זיינע פיינט עד לעפר.
אין איין ווארט; אין תנ''ך איז פונקט אזוי אידיעל נקמה אינעם אויב השם ווי הטבה פארן אוהב השם..
Why did he create the ability to do bad (and for a person to become a רשע)?
מי אניוואס @תוהו ובוהו מיינט איז טאמער נעמט מען אָן אז בחירה איז אן אינטרינסיק בּעיסיק טוב איז יש מקום לומר אז דאס זאל איבערוועגן די מציאות פון רעות וואס קומען ע״כ ארויס דערפון ע״י רוע בחירתן של אנשים - די מעגליכקייט וואס די ״טוב״ פון עצם בחירה ברענגט צו. (דר. עלווין פּלענטינגאַ איז א שטארקע דוגל פון דעם מהלך.) דאס איז וואס אנבאלאנגט רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד דורך די עידזשענסי פון א מענטש [סוג ב׳ וג׳ מהרעות שכלל הרמב״ם]. ולגבי די רעות וואס קומען צושטאנד מהטבע [סוג א׳], וואס די אגענט נעמט מען אָן עפ״י טעאיזם איז הקב״ה, אויב קומט דאס אויף רשעים קען מען דאס אויך פארשטיין ווייל דאס איז אויך א פועל יוצא פון די עצם ״טוב״ פון בחירה וואס מ׳האט אנגענומען כנ״ל; עס איז די עונש על רוע בחירתן. אויב אבער איז די סארט רעות על הצדיק דאן ווערט נולד די קשיא ווייל ער האט דאך יא גוט בוחר געווען.
This implies that God can't create pure goodness, without any evil. This is impossible because God is a
כל יכול.
If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.
פארוואס א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט אויף די. סי. ...?!
berlbalagulehפארוואס א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט אויף די. סי. ...?!
עיין כאן:
<a class="postlink" href="https://www.electricalclassroom.com/dc-voltage-applied-to-transformer-coil/">https://www.electricalclassroom.com/dc- ... rmer-coil/</a>
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניThe square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.
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שארפןקאפberlbalagulehעיין כאן.פארוואס א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט אויף די. סי. ...?!
<a class="postlink" href="https://www.electricalclassroom.com/dc-voltage-applied-to-transformer-coil/">https://www.electricalclassroom.com/dc- ... rmer-coil/</a>
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שארפן קאפ: ייש"כ. נאר דער ארטיקל וואס דו האסט געלינקט האט פארפעלט מסביר צו זיין נאך א קליין נקודה'לע. אז א טרענספארמער ארבעט נישט מיט פיזיקל קאנטאקט פון ביידע קוילס (די פריימערי און די סעקאנדערי.). נאר א..."פולסירנדע" מאגנעטיש פעלד ווען ס'פארמאכט זיך (אזוי ווי ביי עי. סי.) געט עס אריין אן עלעקטריק שטראם אין דעם צווייטן קאויל. דער צווייטער מאגנעטישער קאויל (אדער קנויל) כאפט עס דאמאלס אויף.
די שטארקייט אדער שוואכקייט פון דעם עלעקטריק שטראם (וואלטידזש) ווענדט זיך וועלכער קאויל איז גרעסער. אויב דער שטראם גייט אריין אין דעם גרעסערן איז די וואלטידזש ביים צווייטן קאויל שוואכער. און פארקערט, איז פארקערט...!
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניOn your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.
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ונהפך הואIf God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
ליב צו וויסןIf you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ונהפך הואIf God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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ונהפך הואמי אניOn your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.
True (assuming you accept the first horn of the argument). Although, technically you don’t necessarily have to resort to the preclusion of Logic from the domain of G-d, for this theological difficulty to arise. Meaning, a Negative/Apophatic Theology with regard to G-d and His attributes subsequently entails (some form of) Theological Non-Cognitivism: statements with regard to “His Will” and “His Commandments” are ultimately vacuous. The way one reconciles this difficulty with religious observance can possibly serve to assuage as well this difficulty in the framework of Absolute Omnipotence and the logical preclusion it entails.
ונהפך הואThe square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.
The idea is that it is the essences of the square and circle that preclude them from being in the same substrate in tandem. Now, if one is to accede that Free Will is an intrinsic “Good”, to an extent that it outweighs the evils that can arise when one abuses it which is within its essence of what defines “Free” Will, then stating that He should create Free Will without creating evils is the same contradiction in terms. You can argue that He shouldn’t have created Free Will at all, but in that case this “Good”, which has been conceded outweighs its associated evils, would have been lacking in Creation. In other words, you can’t have one without the other, just as you can’t have a square without its “edginess”.
You can still argue that Free Will is not an intrinsic “Good”; at least insofar as outweighing the evils that accrue as a consequence.
You can still argue that Free Will is not an intrinsic “Good”; at least insofar as outweighing the evils that accrue as a consequence.
ונהפך הואליב צו וויסןIf you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ונהפך הואIf God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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לויט די אידישע רעליגיע דינט מען אים נישט ווייל מען "וויל" (און מען פארשטייט אים...), נאר ווייל מען "מוז".
ונהפך הואליב צו וויסןIf you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ונהפך הואIf God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת לקבל פרס
ליב צו וויסןלויט די אידישע רעליגיע דינט מען אים נישט ווייל מען "וויל" (און מען פארשטייט אים...), נאר ווייל מען "מוז".
און דעם "מוז" קען מען זאגן איז ענליך צום "מוז" פארוואס מען "מוז" זיך אויפירן מאראליש (אפילו אָן אן עוואלושינערי/ציוויליזאציע פערספעקטיוו) צו וואס אטעאיסטן קענען אויך מודה זיין. אין אנדערע ווערטער, מ'היט די מצוות ווייל מען גלייבט אז דאס איז די ריכטיגע זאך צו טוהן (כדי צוצוקומען און באגרייפן מושכלות וכו' וכו' וכדומה) אפגעזעהן פון "רצון" ה' וואס מ'קען טענה'ן האט נישט קיין געהעריגע באדייט אזוי-צי-אזוי וכנ"ל. און איה"נ, די שאלה פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג?" איז טאקע א שווערע שאלה פאר זיך. (מ'דארף אבער אין אכט נעמען אז די אנאלאגוס שאלה, אין אונזער קאנטעקסט, פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג אין סתם מאראליטעט, בפרט טאמער וויל מען אננעמען א מאראלישע ריעליזם?" איז אויך א שווערע [פילאזאפישע] שאלה.)
ליב צו וויסןווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
דא האב איך טאקע אראפגעברענגט אז הקב"ה הוא "תכלית הטוב" איז נישט קיין עיקר בעצם, אבער פונקט אזוי טרעפן מיר נישט אז "כל יכול" זאל זיין אן עיקר (לפי הרמב"ם בעיקריו).
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מצפצףBut he could not only lie about that, what if he's lieing about what's right and wrong? Again, this is clearly false.ונהפך הואליב צו וויסןIf you think he does bad things, then there's no reason to worship him. What if he lied to you about heaven and hell? This is clearly false.ונהפך הואIf God is good and infinitely powerful, and everything he did is because of his goodness, then why did he create evil? Why is there a hell? Why can we feel pain? [emoji848][emoji848][emoji848]
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ווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
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אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת לקבל פרס
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניOn your last point, if God can't do everything, that means that God is not infinite. This could entail that God has a God above him.ליב צו וויסןלויט די אידישע רעליגיע דינט מען אים נישט ווייל מען "וויל" (און מען פארשטייט אים...), נאר ווייל מען "מוז".
און דעם "מוז" קען מען זאגן איז ענליך צום "מוז" פארוואס מען "מוז" זיך אויפירן מאראליש (אפילו אָן אן עוואלושינערי/ציוויליזאציע פערספעקטיוו) צו וואס אטעאיסטן קענען אויך מודה זיין. אין אנדערע ווערטער, מ'היט די מצוות ווייל מען גלייבט אז דאס איז די ריכטיגע זאך צו טוהן (כדי צוצוקומען און באגרייפן מושכלות וכו' וכו' וכדומה) אפגעזעהן פון "רצון" ה' וואס מ'קען טענה'ן האט נישט קיין געהעריגע באדייט אזוי-צי-אזוי וכנ"ל. און איה"נ, די שאלה פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג?" איז טאקע א שווערע שאלה פאר זיך. (מ'דארף אבער אין אכט נעמען אז די אנאלאגוס שאלה, אין אונזער קאנטעקסט, פון "וואס טוהט גראַוּנדן אט די גלויבונג אין סתם מאראליטעט, בפרט טאמער וויל מען אננעמען א מאראלישע ריעליזם?" איז אויך א שווערע [פילאזאפישע] שאלה.)ליב צו וויסןווי שטייט אין תנ"ך אז גאט איז כל כולו גוט, און "אלע" זיינע פעולות זענען "בהכרח" נאר להטיב?
דא האב איך טאקע אראפגעברענגט אז הקב"ה הוא "תכלית הטוב" איז נישט קיין עיקר בעצם, אבער פונקט אזוי טרעפן מיר נישט אז "כל יכול" זאל זיין אן עיקר (לפי הרמב"ם בעיקריו).
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Please explain how:
~Not omnipotent → Not infinite
I don’t see how it necessarily follows. I don’t claim it’s a non-sequitur, I just don’t understand. Unless it’s with regard to power. In which case it’d seem to be a tautology : “not a infinite in power .
(This is all the more so if we don’t deny Omnipotence; we just limit its definition. Meaning, He has power as far as power is logically applicable by His essence etc.).
~Not omnipotent → Not infinite
I don’t see how it necessarily follows. I don’t claim it’s a non-sequitur, I just don’t understand. Unless it’s with regard to power. In which case it’d seem to be a tautology : “not a infinite in power .
(This is all the more so if we don’t deny Omnipotence; we just limit its definition. Meaning, He has power as far as power is logically applicable by His essence etc.).
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניOn your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.ונהפך הואמי אניOn your second paragraph, if you say that God can't be viewed in a logical way, then there's no reason to say anything about him at all. Any logical conclusions about God, like he wants us to do mitsvos, are intrinsically false, because a human could never understand God. So there's no reason to do anything for God, because you are using human logic, which can't be used for god.If it is conceded and agreed that Free Will is an intrinsic good per se and that it outweighs the evils that inevitably arise due to said freedom of choice, then it can be argued that creating Free Will [the “Good”] without the subsequent evils that arise due to its utilization is an internal and logical contradiction. In which case it does not fall within the remit of “possible” and is not within the purview of G-d’s omnipotence; it’d be akin to His “inability” to create a square circle. This is unless one advances a quasi-Frankfurtian position in which Free Will is logically concordant with the inability to actually fulfill an evil choice; cf. Dr. Andrea Weissberger and others. Though, in that case, the philosophical burden of proof has seemingly shifted to those opposing said Theodicy.
If you were to argue from an Absolute Omnipotence stance, in which logical contradictories do not present an impediment to G-d’s power and ability, then the [Logical] Problem of Evil seemingly does not find purchase. For how can one argue a logical contradiction with respect to G-d [“Existence of Evil” against “G-d’s Omnibenevolence”] when in said domain logical contradictions don’t present a difficulty? Unless you wish to differentiate between solely “G-d’s ability/omnipotence” where this issue is of no consequence and the broader idea of G-d in general where it is.True (assuming you accept the first horn of the argument). Although, technically you don’t necessarily have to resort to the preclusion of Logic from the domain of G-d, for this theological difficulty to arise. Meaning, a Negative/Apophatic Theology with regard to G-d and His attributes subsequently entails (some form of) Theological Non-Cognitivism: statements with regard to “His Will” and “His Commandments” are ultimately vacuous. The way one reconciles this difficulty with religious observance can possibly serve to assuage as well this difficulty in the framework of Absolute Omnipotence and the logical preclusion it entails.ונהפך הואThe square circle example you bring up still doesn't answer anything. The reason a square circle is impossible is because god made a square and a circle different. According to this logic, he has to have made free will intrinsically good, and the alternative bad, but our sense of the word "bad" is referring to pain, which God inflicted opon us by making free will a intrinsically good thing. If God was ALL good, then he wouldn't have made free will, a partly bad thing, into a intrinsically good thing.The idea is that it is the essences of the square and circle that preclude them from being in the same substrate in tandem. Now, if one is to accede that Free Will is an intrinsic “Good”, to an extent that it outweighs the evils that can arise when one abuses it which is within its essence of what defines “Free” Will, then stating that He should create Free Will without creating evils is the same contradiction in terms. You can argue that He shouldn’t have created Free Will at all, but in that case this “Good”, which has been conceded outweighs its associated evils, would have been lacking in Creation. In other words, you can’t have one without the other, just as you can’t have a square without its “edginess”.
You can still argue that Free Will is not an intrinsic “Good”; at least insofar as outweighing the evils that accrue as a consequence.
On your second paragraph, I never said that God should create free will, but without the evil, I said that he shouldn't have created free will in the first place.
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניAccording to the Oxford dictionary, omnipotence =infinite (power).Please explain how:
~Not omnipotent → Not infinite
I don’t see how it necessarily follows. I don’t claim it’s a non-sequitur, I just don’t understand. Unless it’s with regard to power. In which case it’d seem to be a tautology : “not a nfinite in .
(This is all the more so if we don’t deny Omnipotence; we just limit its definition. Meaning, He has power as far as power is logically applicable by His essence etc.).
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
Second, it's essence is infinite, if not, then someone could have created god.
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Like I said, a tautology. "Infinite" with regard to power". Though, it seems superfluous to the argument you're advancing. Namely, if He's not omnipotent then maybe there's a being with greater power. I don't see a reason to include a clause of infinity in the argument
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניRight[emoji106]Like I said, a tautology. "Infinite" with regard to power". Though, it seems superfluous to the argument you're advancing. Namely, if He's not omnipotent then maybe there's a being with greater power. I don't see a reason to include a clause of infinity in the argument
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
But I still want to have a answer.
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ונהפך הואOn your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.
Like I said, the Theological Non-Cognitivism and Problem of Religious Language difficulties which arise even without this logical impediment.
Sort of asked and answered with the (admittedly tenuous) analogy to Moral Realism and its grounding.
ונהפך הואOn your second paragraph, I never said that God should create free will, but without the evil, I said that he shouldn't have created free will in the first place.
Like I said, you can reject the "intrinsic Good of Free Will" defense, based on denying the felicity of Free Will over its consequent evils.
ונהפך הואBut I still want to have a answer.
I guess if Omnipotence is not completely denied (as I stated in parentheses) just redefined in such a way so as to still retain the maximal power logically allowed, then this precludes a superior being. This can allow as well to retain "infinite power" with regard to its [logically infinite] maximization
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניA agree with both, but now: why should we do things for God if we can't understand him logically? Secondly, why did God create free will?ונהפך הואOn your first paragraph, if you concede that we can't think of God in a logical way, then there's no way to know if we should follow him. We don't even know what he wants/needs us to do, because we're thinking of "want"/"need" in a logical way.
Like I said, the Theological Non-Cognitivism and Problem of Religious Language difficulties which arise even if without this logical impediment.
Sort of asked and answered with the (admittedly tenuous) analogy to Moral Realism.
ונהפך הואOn your second paragraph, I never said that God should create free will, but without the evil, I said that he shouldn't have created free will in the first place.
Like I said, you can reject the "intrinsic Good of Free Will" defense, based on denying the felicity of Free Will over its consequent evils.
(By the way, you have excellent grammar)
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אני
דא האב איך טאקע אראפגעברענגט אז הקב"ה הוא "תכלית הטוב" איז נישט קיין עיקר בעצם, אבער פונקט אזוי טרעפן מיר נישט אז "כל יכול" זאל זיין אן עיקר (לפי הרמב"ם בעיקריו).
מ'מוז אפילו נישט צורירן דעם ''תכלית הטוב''.
ס'ווענדט זיך אין די דעפיניציע פון ''טוב'', אויב טוב מיינט אזא מאדערנע וועלטס אויסקוק ווי האבן ווייטאג איז ע''כ רע, דאן פעלט מעגליך אין תכלית הטוב, אבער אזא סארט טוב איז לכאורה בכלל נישט אידיאל אין תנ''ך'ס וועלט-אויסקוק.
אין אנדערע ווערטער געבן גוטס פאר א רשע ווערט מעגליך בכלל נישט אנגערופן ''טוב'' אין תנ''ך'ס ווערטער-בוך, און דעריבער טוט גאטס פארשניידן רשעים בכלל נישט אינטערמינעווען ''תכלית הטוב'' (נאר מעגליך עס גאר פארשטערקערן ווייל טוב פאר א רשע איז מעגליך ''רע''..)
כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניס'איז אבער נישט מאראל צו אריינלייגן מענטשן אין א unnecessary challenge.כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".
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ונהפך הואA agree with both, but now: why should we do things for God if we can't understand him logically? Secondly, why did God create free will?.
(By the way, you have excellent grammar)[/quote]
Thank you!.
To answer the first question I’d say, from a philosophical theological perspective, that you do not follow them [precepts etc.] “for G-d”: the statement is “empty”. What grounds it is, I guess, “Revelation”, though this itself obviously needs to be (re)defined.
With regard to the second question, it seems that it implies as premises both an acceptance of the existence (for lack of a better term) of G-d, as well as a rejection of (at least Hard) Determinism. In which case it would seem that in order to maintain consistency, one will seemingly be compelled to assert that Free Will IS an intrinsic Good, despite its consequently resulting evils. This thus justifies its creation. Alternatively, one can possibly argue that it is a logical impossibility to create Man qua Man without Free Will. (Seemingly analogous to the intuitive Deterministic position, where Man qua Man will inevitably have the intuitive illusion of Free Will.) In which case, one need not concede that Free Will is an intrinsic Good despite assenting to the two aforementioned premises.
To answer the first question I’d say, from a philosophical theological perspective, that you do not follow them [precepts etc.] “for G-d”: the statement is “empty”. What grounds it is, I guess, “Revelation”, though this itself obviously needs to be (re)defined.
With regard to the second question, it seems that it implies as premises both an acceptance of the existence (for lack of a better term) of G-d, as well as a rejection of (at least Hard) Determinism. In which case it would seem that in order to maintain consistency, one will seemingly be compelled to assert that Free Will IS an intrinsic Good, despite its consequently resulting evils. This thus justifies its creation. Alternatively, one can possibly argue that it is a logical impossibility to create Man qua Man without Free Will. (Seemingly analogous to the intuitive Deterministic position, where Man qua Man will inevitably have the intuitive illusion of Free Will.) In which case, one need not concede that Free Will is an intrinsic Good despite assenting to the two aforementioned premises.
ונהפך הואמי אניס'איז אבער נישט מאראל צו אריינלייגן מענטשן אין א unnecessary challenge.כ'האב עס דארט אונטערגעלאנט אז מען וויל נישט, עכ"פ לפי הרמב"ם (בח"ג פט"ז), אונטערמינעווען דעם פארשטאנד פון "טוב" לגביו כביכול פון אונזער פערסעפשאן און הגדרה פון וואס "טוב" מיינט: א "מאראלישער" סארט "טוב".
איה״נ. אבער דאס איז אננעמענדיג אז ס׳וואלט געווען מעגליך אנדערש אין די זאך אליין וככל הנ״ל.
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
Can I clarify what you need to (re)define?
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In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניWhy would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)
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Because that precisely how you become an apikoros
ונהפך הואמי אניWhy would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)
I fully acknowledge and admit that it’s a form of Belief Perseverance and highly apologetic in nature. Though, in its defense, this in-and-of-itself has no bearing on the actual truth value of the claim defended.
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניNo, it does. You're talking about possible answers(like the possibility to redefine "revelation"), not concrete answers. The only reason to KNOW it's true is because of your already existing belief, which is, as you said, a form of belief perseverance.ונהפך הואמי אניWhy would you go in a fideistic approach? Isn't the way to figure out the truth by looking against your biases, and not look for conformation?In short, “Revelation” is seemingly what grounds one’s commitment to “G-d’s” (for lack of a better term) commandments. However, this itself is seemingly fraught with difficulties owing to the aforementioned non-cognitivism etc. associated with language in reference to G-d. Thus, in order to avoid this difficulty the theist can possibly (re)define “Revelation” as one’s fideistic and purely subjective assent to the veracity (again for lack of a better term) of said said commandments etc. This is thus what grounds his commitment. (This can seemingly segue into existentialism in general and its associated philosophical strands.)
I fully acknowledge and admit that it’s a form of Belief Perseverance and highly apologetic in nature. Though, in its defense, this in-and-of-itself has no bearing on the actual truth value of the claim defended.
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
רביה''ק זי''עAnd that's precisely how you don't answer a question.Because that precisely how you become an apikoros
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Don't you see for yourself that you're dealing with people who are more concerned with the perseverance of their beliefs than with the objective truth? What kind of a question is this "Why don't you try to look past your biases"?! They don't want to look past their biases because they want to maintain their belief system and way of life
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
רביה''ק זי''עI didn't say "why don't YOU try to look past your biases." I just wondered, for me, how to look at the world, that's it.Don't you see for yourself that you're dealing with people who are more concerned with the perseverance of their beliefs than with the objective truth? What kind of a question is this "Why don't you try to look past your biases"?! They don't want to look past their biases because they want to maintain their belief system and way of life
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Ok, so if that's the question then you can look at the world however and whichever way you want, philosophy and theology is just bs confirmation bias hodge podge from very smart and educated white men, as it says in the verse: Philosophy is just white guys j**king off
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
רביה''ק זי''עRight, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.Ok, so if that's the question then you can look at the world however and whichever way you want, philosophy and theology is just bs confirmation bias hodge podge from very smart and educated white men, as it says in the verse: Philosophy is just white guys j**king off
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ונהפך הוא[d ]No, it does. You're talking about possible answers(like the possibility to redefine "revelation"), not concrete answers. The only reason to KNOW it's true is because of your already existing belief, which is, as you said, a form of belief perseverance.
There seem to be two disparate arguments here:
1). That due to the answers/positions being advanced stemming from the theist’s preconceived biases, and not an objective seeking of truth, this in-and-of-itself negates the warrant of said belief being defended. This was implied in the earlier post. To which I replied that this is not the case; it is a form of an Appeal to Motive/Bulverism fallacy.
2). Questioning the warrant of Fideism; if belief in divinity is properly basic. This I understand to be implied by the second post. If Plantinga’s position is cogent that it IS properly basic [“I KNOW [read “believe”] it’s true because of my already existing belief”], then I fail to see how resorting to redefinitions of popular conceptions within Theism, to which the individual theist has never assented, in-and-of-themselves serve to undermine said existing belief, if they are not proven to be inconsistent with his fideistic accepted belief. You have not shown it to be so. The claim that the theist cannot provide demonstrative and conclusive rebuttals [my understanding of “concrete” in this context] does not negate their truth-value if the objections levied against his beliefs are not demonstrative in their own right. Or alternatively, if his rebuttals serve, at the very least, to undermine the demonstrativeness of his opponent’s arguments.
ונהפך הואRight, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.
Ok, at least your'e not confused anymore and you now have the clarity that you're looking for meaning and not for facts
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
רביה''ק זי''עIf only I was actually clear by myself.ונהפך הואRight, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.
Ok, at least your'e not confused anymore and you now have the clarity that you're looking for meaning and not for facts
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Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
מי אניI never tried to imply "1)". And for the second one, your whole idea relies around the accuracy of reformed epistemology, and not evidentialism, which I fail to see the reason for.ונהפך הוא[d ]No, it does. You're talking about possible answers(like the possibility to redefine "revelation"), not concrete answers. The only reason to KNOW it's true is because of your already existing belief, which is, as you said, a form of belief perseverance.
There seem to be two disparate arguments here:
1). That due to the answers/positions being advanced stemming from the theist’s preconceived biases, and not an objective seeking of truth, this in-and-of-itself negates the warrant of said belief being defended. This was implied in the earlier post. To which I replied that this is not the case; it is a form of an Appeal to Motive/Bulverism fallacy.
2). Questioning the warrant of Fideism; if belief in divinity is properly basic. This I understand to be implied by the second post. If Plantinga’s position is cogent that it IS properly basic [“I KNOW [read “believe”] it’s true because of my already existing belief”], then I fail to see how resorting to redefinitions of popular conceptions within Theism, to which the individual theist has never assented, in-and-of-themselves serve to undermine said existing belief, if they are not proven to be inconsistent with his fideistic accepted belief. You have not shown it to be so. The claim that the theist cannot provide demonstrative and conclusive rebuttals [my understanding of “concrete” in this context] does not negate their truth-value if the objections levied against his beliefs are not demonstrative in their own right. Or alternatively, if his rebuttals serve, at the very least, to undermine the demonstrativeness of his opponent’s arguments.
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ונהפך הוארביה''ק זי''עIf only I was actually clear by myself.ונהפך הואRight, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.
Ok, at least your'e not confused anymore and you now have the clarity that you're looking for meaning and not for facts
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So you're relying on us shteeble members to figure out for you what you want?! Sorry but it just doesn't work that way, you gotta figure it out for yourself. Maybe go talk to a therapist, go to a meditation retreat, take some hallucinogenics, or anything else that you think might help you to figure out what you want in life
Re: זאכן וואס כ'וויל וויסן
רביה''ק זי''עOr maybe I'll just go to sleep.ונהפך הוארביה''ק זי''עIf only I was actually clear by myself.ונהפך הואRight, but if I just look for meaning myself, then it's a even bigger conformation bias hodge podge, let me live with abit less hodge podge.
Ok, at least your'e not confused anymore and you now have the clarity that you're looking for meaning and not for facts
Sent from my SM-G781U using Tapatalk
So you're relying on us shteeble members to figure out for you what you want?! Sorry but it just doesn't work that way, you gotta figure it out for yourself. Maybe go talk to a therapist, go to a meditation retreat, take some hallucinogenics, or anything else that you think might help you to figure out what you want in life
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ונהפך הואI never tried to imply "1)". And for the second one, your whole idea relies around the accuracy of reformed epistemology, and not evidentialism, which I fail to see the reason for.[/quote][.
True. Though, as mentioned, evidentialism itself is ultimately lacking in regard to metaphysical claims; the aforementioned analogy to moral/ethical beliefs and values. Unless you ground it in a purely evolutionary etc. perspective which itself introduces an array of difficulties/weaknesses [e.g. is/ought etc.].