א נחמה פאר א צעבראכענעם אבל - וועקער 18

מי אני

עס איז אויך מערקווידיג אינעם שמועס צוצוצייכענען צום מאמר העולם, ״אויב די וועלט וואלט געווען פּערפעקט וואלט עס נישט געווען פּערפעקט.״

ברוינשטיין

מי אני

ער מאכט א חילוק צווישן 4 סארטן טעאדיסיס:

‏1). יוּניווערסאליסט - וואס די הנחות דערפון וואלטן אפילו אטעאיסטן אָנגענומען [צב״ש אז די טוב פון בחירה חופשית איז מער ווי די רע פון די צער בעולם; דאס דערמאנט נישט בעצם ״ג-ט״ אין די הנחה]

אטעאיסטן גלויבן אין בחירה חופשית?

ברוינשטיין

ווי אויך פארשטיי איך נישט די חשבון אז די טוב פון בחירה חופשית איז מער פון די צער בעולם, אפשר איז ער מסביר מער באריכות אין ענגליש, אבער ס'איז מיר שווער צו ליינען ענגליש אויף אזאנע קאמפלעצירטע טעמעס.

ברוינשטיין

מי אני

עס איז אויך מערקווידיג אינעם שמועס צוצוצייכענען צום מאמר העולם, ״אויב די וועלט וואלט געווען פּערפעקט וואלט עס נישט געווען פּערפעקט.״

וואס הייסט?

Nevertheless, Nahmanides was forced by the Bible, the halakhah, and intuitions influenced by philosophy or common sense or both, to recognize that natural law often does operate — even for Jews and probably even for the Jewish collective. Consequently, a careful examination of the totality of Nahmanides’ comments on this issue reveals nature in operation ninety-nine percent of the time, and it is perforce nature without providence, since “natural,” indirect providence is a contradiction in terms. Nahmanides’ world is therefore exceptionally — extraordinarily — naturalistic precisely because of his insistence on the miraculous nature of providence

ודע כי הנסים לא יעשו לטובה או לרעה רק לצדיקים גמורים או לרשעים גמורים אבל הבינונים כדרך מנהגו של עולם יעשה בהם טובה או רעה כדרכם וכעלילותם

כי ידיעת השם שהיא השגחתו בעולם השפל היא לשמור הכללים וגם בני האדם מונחים בו למקרים עד בא עת פקודתם אבל בחסידיו ישום אליו לבו לדעת אותו בפרט להיות שמירתו דבקה בו תמיד לא תפרד הידיעה והזכירה ממנו כלל כטעם לא יגרע מצדיק עיניו (איוב לו ז) ובאו מזה פסוקים רבים כדכתיב (תהלים לג יח) הנה עין ה' אל יראיו וזולת זה.

The whole of natural reality is religiously irrelevant — “the world pursues its course”... God is not revealed in natural reality, and the claim of “God’s hand” in a natural event bears traces of pantheism or polytheism... No meaning should be sought in history that, like nature, is meaningless... and no religious aura should be attached to the course of history

Another traditional theodicy that potentially requires libertarian free will is that God brings about or allows evil as punishment for sin. Now no feature of hard determinism per se rules out a deterrence theory or a moral education theory of punishment, but retributivism, as it is usually conceived, would be precluded. What is lost as a result? It is implausible to think that in William Rowe’s example, the five-year-old girl deserves to be punished by being raped and beaten by virtue of anything she has done. Does an ordinary person, never having committed a serious crime, and who is not in any other respect an extraordinary sinner, deserve to suffer from a lengthy, painful, and fatal disease as punishment for the wrongs he has done? Our judicial system would regard punishment of this sort for serious crimes as monstrous. Imagine if we were to punish murderers by inducing such suffering – who would find that conscionable?

Someone might reply that because each of us deserves an eternity of torture, a fortiori each of us also deserves suffering of this sort. But because it is doubtful that anyone genuinely understands why we all might deserve punishment of this degree as a matter of retributive justice alone, this line of thought does not promise a plausible theodicy. Let me emphasize that even thinking of ordinary people as deserving a long and painful disease, for example, would constitute a serious revision in our moral practice, for in that practice, sympathy without reservation is the appropriate response

The starting assumption of the theodicean discourse is God’s characterization as a good God. Since God is perceived as morally good, an evil reality is perceived as a contradiction to God’s existence. In this discourse, the good is apprehended as a “common attribute” of God and humanity, and this partnership enables the theodicean discourse. Goldman, however, argues that the good is not necessarily a common feature:

When we speak of a red house, a red book, red wine, and so forth, the term “red” appears as a common attribute of various objects... By contrast, when we speak of a good book, a good cobbler, or a good teacher, the attribute leading us to claim that a particular one is good is different in each case. The term “good” is evaluative. In each of the contexts we use it, we assume a criterion that we generally use in that particular context and serves us to evaluate objects or actions positively or negatively. The use of the term “good” in two different contexts does not prove that we are using the same criterion in both cases

This analysis attests that the shared component of these modes of use in the term “good” is merely formal and therefore entirely empty: “good” is an expression of judgment and evaluation but not necessarily moral judgment and evaluation. What, then, is the meaning of the term good in regard to God? Is it a moral evaluation? Goldman answers: “In the context of metaphysical methods used by classic theologians, the term [good] was intended as some kind of unique metaphysical perfection in God. Classic theology always stresses the metaphorical character of the term ‘good’ in reference to God”. Indeed, the use of the concept good in the sense pointed out by Goldman is prominent already in Platonic tradition: good is self-containment and independence from external elements. Plato formulates this as follows: “The good differs from everything else in a certain respect . . . A creature that possesses it permanently, completely, and absolutely, has never any need of anything else; its satisfaction is perfect.”

This analysis, however, does not entirely undermine the theodicean discourse because religious traditions in general, and Jewish ones in particular, abound with moral value statements about God. Even if Greek tradition and classic theology used “good” concerning God as denoting perfection and wholeness, we could still claim that religious traditions use “good” concerning God in its common moral denotation. To reject this option, Goldman engages in a series of moves. First, if we do indeed adhere to the language of Jewish tradition, assigning God only the quality of moral goodness would not fit the tradition itself:

This is a matter of choosing the convenient verses. Other descriptions could be cited— “jealous and vengeful” “full of wrath” “puts no trust in his servants”— showing an entirely different attitude of the Creator to his creatures. A suitable choice of biblical verses could even support a description of a cruel despot that Christians and liberal critics sometimes wish to present as the prophets’ description of God

the criterion for evaluating the metaphysical theory is not the measure of its rationality or sophistication, but its ability to respond to true human needs. Its acceptance is contingent on its therapeutic powers, its “remedial energy.”

In this text, Hartman lays the foundation for what will become a dominant element of his philosophy — the test of theodicy is not theoretical but practical. Theodicy cannot provide an absolute speculative solution to the problem of evil in the world; its ability to provide an answer is contingent upon the particular disposition of those who need it. Theodicy, then, has a socio-political rather than a metaphysical role. Hartman illustrates this approach with an analysis of various solutions that Maimonides proposes for suffering and pain. In his view, Maimonides was aware of the socio-political role of theodicy. Therefore: “In addressing the sufferer, one must be sensitive to the specific needs of the person in question. Because Maimonides [in the “Epistle to Yemen”] is trying to comfort and encourage a suffering community, he uses multiple models and suggestions directed at the different types of people comprising his audience.” This functional perception of theodicy enables Hartman to make two moves. The first is to explain the existence of a tradition endorsing theodicy in Judaism, and the second is to dismiss the metaphysical value of this approach and reexamine it. His conclusion is that theodicy is a cognitive answer to the problem of evil, whose sole test is the measure of its acceptance:

A constant gap between our perception of our relationship to a personal God and the reality of the world that we believe He created and rules is liable to give rise to repeated frustration. The question then is: How long can any attempt to cope with the frustration succeed in containing it? How long is it before we decide that the relationship no longer exists or that it is not worth having? To this question there is no single universal answer applicable equally to all human beings

Hartman can now argue that the various rabbinic responses to suffering, relating to it as “chastenings of love” or calls to repentance, can hardly be considered decisive answers to this question. In principle, we can hardly predict what response will comfort a suffering soul, and this is a matter contingent on the difference between human dispositions:

Some find the unpredictable dimensions of reality to be [so] overwhelming... For them, suffering is bearable if it results from the limitations of finite human beings, but it becomes terrifying and demonic if it is seen as part of the scheme of their all-powerful Creator. Others would find life unbearably chaotic if they could not believe that suffering, tragedy, and death were part of God’s plan for the world feeling that there is meaning and order in the world and that God in His wisdom decided to terminate the life of their loved ones makes their tragedy bearable

This approach continues the programmatic line that Soloveitchik had set originally, but is expressed more coherently in Hartman’s thought. From a pragmatic-empirical vantage point, the traditional theological discussion of the problem of evil is merely a “disruption,” since human beings do not opt for faith (or the alternative) as a function of theological or theodicean propositions. We can handle evil only by shifting the center of gravity to a life of actual faith. Hartman speaks of this displacement as a transition from “philosophical theology” to “religious anthropology”. The crucial question is not the one bearing on theology and theodicy but the religious-existentialist question. In this discussion, the key issue is the person’s ability to go on believing when faced with evil, not the justification of God. In Hartman’s terms, the main question is not theodicy, but the modes of response to suffering

Existentialist faith assumes that, structurally, the relationship with God resembles human interactions. Human relationships are constantly tested and contingent on real events, as well as on the baggage borne by each individual. Individuals have expectations from God, and relate to God as loving and just. The rift of evil casts doubts on the possibility of sustaining this view. People do not ask themselves whether God is right, but “how can I sustain commitment to a way of life predicated on God’s covenantal love and justice?” This question is doomed to remain open, since no universal, metaphysical single solution can provide answers to human distress

For Hartman, the practical-existential shift of the problem of evil and suffering is anchored in two mutually related considerations: one is human responsibility and freedom, and the other is covenantal theology. The theodicean view of suffering could hinder human readiness to act — if suffering, evil and pain are justified, why struggle against them?: “If we are to uphold the dignity implied by the notion of the covenant, with its full respect for ourselves as rational and moral beings, we must reject attempts to see all of nature and history as mediating God’s personal will”. This consideration is based both on the primary affirmation of human rationality and of our value as human creatures, and on the appropriate theology. The primary affirmation of human value is embodied in the refusal to adopt a disposition of constant guilt. This disposition is imperative for the endorsement of a theodicean view — if the God that is the cause of suffering and evil is right, human beings are guilty. Relentless guilt is a deep injury to a sense of worth, to the possibility of experiencing ourselves as free agents allowed to operate according to our own understanding. This theodicy, then, “in no way fits what we know about ourselves in reality”. In sum, a theodicy that justifies God humiliates human beings, affronts their dignity, their understanding of reality, and their freedom

In Hartman’s thought, this incongruence between human worthiness and a theodicean viewpoint conveys a deep incompatibility between theodicy and covenantal theology. Hartman’s philosophical endeavor is an attempt to reframe covenantal theology, which allows to present evil and suffering in religious-existentialist terms rather than in a theodicean context

Covenantal theology is based on the assumption that God and human beings act as partners entering a covenant — on the one hand, God as a personality, and on the other, the Jewish collective. Hartman clarifies in his analysis the meaning of this interpersonal partnership. The God of the covenant is not the “Aristotelian God” but a personality, meaning that causality categories are irrelevant: as a personality is multifaceted and unresponsive to this category, so is God

Similarly, the human partner also deserves dignity and respect: “the covenant encourages human dignity and initiative”. The covenant, wherein God enters into a partnership with human beings as creatures who are at once limited and free, is an affirmation of human existence in its finitude

Covenantal theology is based on a limitation of God’s role in the natural and historical world on the one hand, and on the imposition of responsibility on human beings on the other. The displacement of the burden of responsibility is evident, above all, in God’s removal from nature and history:

We do not have to seek a personal manifestation of God in the events of nature or of history. Suffering and human tragedy are not signs of divine rejection or punishment. God’s providential concern is manifested in the guidance provided by the Torah. God is present as a personal reality through the hearing of mitzvot

The meaning of this displacement implies a recognition of history’s and nature’s neutral character. Human beings are sovereign agents in history, and historical events are within the realm of human responsibility. The world has the regularity of nature, in which God never interferes. For Hartman, this approach is fully evident in Maimonides’ philosophy, which he analyzes at length. The neutralization of history and of nature is a full affirmation of reality: the only reality is immanent reality. It is neither justified by invoking a theodicy nor is it a stage in an eschatological outlook

מי אני

דאס גייט סתם אזוי אין איינקלאנג מיט דר. עריק קאַלדעק׳ס טענה אז דאס׳ן הרג׳ענען איינעם איז מיניה וביה די גרעסטע צער וואס מ׳קען טוהן איינעם אפגעזעהן פון די טובה וואס קומט ארויס דערפון פאר אים דערנאך. .

ווי קען א מענטש גיין אין זיך שיסן? רוב מענטשן זענען גרייט צו דורכגיין געוואלדיגע צער, און וועלן דאך זיך נישט נעמען דאס לעבן. טראץ אלע צער האבן זיי עפעס א געוויסע רוח חיים.

לאמיר אייך מיטטיילן א בדידי הוי עובדא: מיט א צען יאר צוריק האב איך עוסק געווען אין ראטעווען א אידיש קינד וואס איז געווען אין א סכנה פון טויט שטראף. איך האב געברענגט צום עולם'ס אויפמערקזאמקייט די געשיכטע פון הירש ברוך, א אידישע נשמה פון לאנג איילאנד וואס האט זיך דערקייקלט צו זינד און געווען פארמישט אין א מארד געשיכטע און איז געווען אין א סכנה פון טויט שטראף. מיר האבן געשאפט דאס געלט פאר די גוטע אדוואקאטן וואס האבן אראפגענומען די סכנה פון טויט שטראף. ער זיצט לאנגע יארן אין א טורמע אין קאליפארניע.

איך האב בשעתו אסאך גערעדט מיט אים. ער פלעגט מיר רופן גאר אפט פון די טורמע און רעדן וועגן זיין קעיס און בעטן הילף. ער האט געבעטן אידישע ספרים און א קשר צו אידישקייט, און געזוכט אור אין זיין פינסטערניש. רעד איך אמאל מיט אים און איך דערצייל אים איבער איינער וואס איז באגאנגען זעלבסטמארד. זיין רעאקציע איז געווען גאר נעגאטיוו אויף איינער וואס נעמט זיך דאס לעבן. ווי קען א מענטש טון אזא זאך! עס איז אזוי סעלפיש! ברוטאל!

איך האב מיר נישט געקענט איינהאלטן און איך האב אים געפרעגט: אזוי פילסטו? די פארשטייסט נישט א מענטש וואס באגייט זעלבסטמארד? קוק דיר אן, די ביסטו אין דיין דרייסיגער יארן, פאר'משפט פארן לעבן אין די שרעקעדיגע טורמע. די ביסטו שטאקן אונטער די ערד אין א מאקסימום סעקיוריטי תפיסה. פארשפארט און איזאלירט אין ד' אמות מיט ווילדע מענטשן און פארברעכער? זיין ענטפער איז געווען: לעבן איז פיל מיט סופרייזעס. זאכן טוישן זיך. מען גייט נישט עס ענדיגן דאס לעבן וועגן יעצט איז שלעכט. אלעס טוישט זיך, נייע צייטן וועלן קומען... איך וויל נישט ענדיגן מיין לעצטע האפנונג. און איך האב די ליבשאפט פון מיין מאמע וואס האלט מיר ביים לעבן, ווי קען איך איר וויי טון? דיין געשיכטע ענדיגט זיך נישט פאר זיי ווען די גייסט. זיי בלייבן דא מיט די ברוכווארג! ווי קען מען דאס טון?

לפי שאי אפשר שתהיה תורת השי״ת שלמה באופן שתספיק בכל הזמנים, לפי שהפרטים המתחדשים תמיד בעניני האנשים במשפטים והדברים הנפעלים הם רבים מאד משיכללם ספר, על כן נתנו למשה בסיני על פה דרכים כוללים נרמזו בתורה בקצרה, כדי שעל ידם יוציאו החכמים שבכל דור ודור הפרטים המתחדשים.

The basic difference between the Torah’s and Maimonides’s view is the way in which providential care works. In the Torah, religious and ethical behavior is the basis for God’s involvement. For the Rambam, on the other hand, the criterion is human intellectual attainment. From Maimonides’s perspective, God does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked, but rather between the wise and the foolish. The closer someone has come to reaching rational perfection, the greater is God’s providential concern for that person

Furthermore, reason is not just the cause of God’s involvement in a person’s life; it is also the medium through which one receives God’s providence. God saves the rational individual by penetrating his consciousness: “Providence is consequent upon the intellect and is attached to it” (Guide, 3:17)

How, then, is the work of providence accomplished? Not by preventing disasters from happening in the rational person’s vicinity. If, according to circumstances and the laws of physics, a particular building is “supposed to” fall down, it will. If meteorological conditions are such that a certain ship is going to sink at sea, it will sink. But God’s providence is manifested by preventing a person from deciding to enter the shaky building or board the doomed vessel. God does not uproot the laws of nature. Rather, He protects the wise through their minds

This concept of providence begs many questions. First, it does not stand up to the test of experience. We see in life that wise people are not immune from tragedies and disasters. In addition, the theory raises problems of consistency within the Rambam’s writings. By implying that God restricts the free choice of the enlightened individual in order to protect him from harm, the Rambam seems to be contradicting what he writes in other places: that God never interferes in human decisions. Maimonides makes this claim when explaining Moses’s educational role after the Exodus from Egypt. Four hundred years of immersion in Egyptian paganism had left their mark on the Jewish people. The forty years in the desert were a kind of therapy that served to erase the fingerprints of idolatry. Maimonides asks why God needed to lead the people on such a long and arduous journey in order to free them from the after-effects of idol worship. Couldn’t He have simply performed a psychological miracle? Why didn’t He simply enter the Israelites’ souls and wipe out the remaining tendencies toward idolatry? Maimonides then lays down an important rule: God does not take away our free choice

A person’s consciousness is his autonomous realm. Within it, he alone is sovereign. Here is the textual problem: According to part 3, chapter 17 of the Guide, human consciousness is a domain in which God intervenes, whereas in part 3, chapter 32, it is not. We have here a “contradiction of the seventh kind,” which, as we discussed earlier, aims to conceal from the reader profound and sometimes radical ideas

Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon, a medieval commentator on the Guide, made one of the earliest attempts to resolve this contradiction. He understood part 3, chapter 17 not as saying that God interferes in our thought processes but rather that human thought processes themselves are our divine, providential protection. The wise man is protected from harm because he knows how to avoid getting into dangerous situations like unstable buildings and ships during storms. Reason, the godly part in each of us, is what protects us from harm. This naturalistic reading finds support in the next chapter [18] of the Guide

Just as vision protects one from stumbling on obstacles along the way, so reason acts as an inner eye guarding against danger. Someone who orders his life rationally, maintains his emotional equilibrium, doesn’t smoke, and eats in a healthy way is much less likely to be exposed to pain and suffering. The eyes of reason will protect him from many of life’s traps

Ibn Tibbon’s point is that rather than God protecting us, we protect ourselves. Our intellect, the godly within us, saves us from danger. This approach resolves the contradiction with part 3, chapter 32 of the Guide. Providence does not limit human freedom. On the contrary, it is a consequence of our choice to develop intellectually

However, Ibn Tibbon’s reading turns out to cause other problems. While his answer resolves the tensions between the chapters that we have seen so far (part 3, chapters 17 and 32), it contradicts what Maimonides writes in part 3, chapter 51, where he returns to the question of how God watches over the enlightened

Providence confers protection upon the enlightened one. On a battlefield, thousands may fall, but the perfect man will walk away safe and sound. This is clearly different from part 3, chapter 17, where the Rambam says that a wise man should stay out of dangerous situations. Part 3, chapter 51 claims that even if wise people place themselves in peril, they will be protected. This is a big problem for Ibn Tibbon’s naturalistic understanding of providence. Can one really argue that wise people who walk on to a firing range will be saved because they have learned rational techniques for dodging artillery shells? Naturalistic approaches to providence simply do not cover graphic, miraculous descriptions such as “a thousand shall fall at your side and ten thousand at your right hand, but they shall not come close to you. With your eyes you shall behold and see the recompense of the wicked.”

We seem to have reached an impasse. The idea of providence advanced in chapter 17, where God intervenes in human consciousness, contradicts the theory of freedom in chapter 34. The possible solution to this tension — full naturalization of providence — contradicts chapter 51, in which the enlightened are literally protected in extreme circumstances. What is the secret teaching about providence that these multiple contradictions conceal?

The key to resolving these contradictory ideas about providence lies in our earlier discussion of evil. It is not that the enlightened ones never encounter harmful events. Rather, they do not experience such incidents as being harmful. The thirst for knowledge of God frees them from dependence on this world; the spiritual life is their shield. People who love God with their whole being will enjoy total protection from the painful vicissitudes of this world

Absolute love of God saves a person from emotional dependence on anything else in the world. As we saw from Maimonides’s explanation of Job, much of our suffering is subjective. Job’s suffering ends when he stops experiencing the disasters of his life as disasters. Personal redemption comes from love of God. The more we love God, the more we will be freed from the pain and distress of this world. Providential protection, then, is a human cognitive achievement

אַךְ טוֹבַת הַסִּבּוֹת הַמִּקְרִיּוֹת אֵינֶנָּה נִמְנַעַת מִן הָרָשָׁע, כָּל שֶׁכֵּן מֵהֶחָסִיד. וְטוֹבַת הָרְשָׁעִים הִיא בַּסִּבּוֹת הָהֵם הַמִּקְרִיּוֹת וְהַטִּבְעִיּוֹת, וְאֵין דּוֹחֶה לְרָעָתָם כְּשֶׁתָּבוֹא, אֲבָל הַחֲסִידִים יַצְלִיחוּ בַסִּבּוֹת הָהֵם, וְהֵם בְּטוּחִים מֵרָעָתָם.

I have already said I think that most people who are suffering are not really experiencing an intellectual problem but rather an emotional problem. Now you might think to yourself at this point, well then why go through all of this intellectual material if it’s really not the problem. Well, two reasons, I think. First of all people think that their problem is intellectual, so by working through the responses to the logical and evidential problems of evil we can help them to see what the real problem is and treat their opinion with respect. But secondly I think that what I’ve shared with you this afternoon can be of tremendous help and encouragement when you yourself are called upon to endure terrible suffering

Paradoxically then, even though the problem of suffering is the greatest objection to the existence of God, at the end of the day, God is the only solution to the problem of suffering. If God does not exist then we are locked in a world filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering. God is the final answer to the problem of suffering

For although I had long ceased to believe in the efficacy of prayer, I was so lonely and so in need of some supporter such as the Christian God, that I took to saying prayers again when I ceased to believe in their efficacy

The way of understanding miracle that appeals to breaks in the natural order and to supernatural interventions belongs to the mythological outlook and cannot commend itself in a post-mythological climate of thought . . . The traditional conception of miracle is irreconcilable with our modern understanding of both science and history. Science proceeds on the assumption that whatever events occur in the world can be accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world; and if on some occasions we are unable to give a complete account of some happening . . . the scientific conviction is that further research will bring to light further factors in the situation, but factors that will turn out to be just as immanent and this-worldly as those already known

contemporary theology does not expect, nor does it speak of, wondrous divine events on the surface of natural and historical life. The causal nexus in space and time which the Enlightenment science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind . . . is also assumed by modern theologians and scholars; since they participate in the modern world of science both intellectually and existentially, they can scarcely do anything else. Now this assumption of a causal order among phenomenal events, and therefore of the authority of the scientific interpretation of observable events, makes a great difference to the validity one assigns to biblical narratives and so to the way one understands their meaning. Suddenly a vast panoply of divine deeds and events recorded in scripture are no longer regarded as having actually happened. . . . Whatever the Hebrews believed, we believe that the biblical people lived in the same causal continuum of space and time in which we live, and so one in which no divine wonders transpired and no divine voices were heard

Miracles cannot be interpreted in terms of supranatural interference in natural processes. If such an interpretation were true, the manifestation of the ground of being would destroy the structure of being; God would be split within himself

One final observation: believers often like to have it both ways. One person will thank God for sparing him, while telling the neighbor whose home's been demolished that it's not God's fault. But this doesn't make sense. If God actually intervened to save the first person's home, then shame on Him for not doing the same for the second person's. And if the reason that He didn't save the second person's is that the poor bugger's homelessness was part of some unfathomable Divine Plan, then the first person shouldn't take things personally either. The only way out of this dilemma that I can see is to say that each person deserved what they got - i.e. bad things don't happen to good people. If anyone says this, they have, in my view, left the company of decent people

of all the anti-theistic arguments, only the argument from evil deserves to be taken really seriously; and he devotes several pages to the problem of evil

Here’s a relevant passage:

Why does God permit all this evil, and evil of these horrifying kinds, in his world? How can it be seen as fitting in with his loving and providential care for his creatures?

The Christian must concede she doesn't know. That is, she doesn't know in any detail. On a quite general level, she may know that God permits evil because he can achieve a world he sees as better by permitting evil than by preventing it; and what God sees as better is, of course, better. But we cannot see why our world with all its ills, would be better than others we think we can conceive, or what, in any detail, is God's reason for permitting a given specific and appalling evil. Not only can we not see this, we often can't think of any very good possibilities. A Christian must therefore admit that he doesn't know why God permits the evils this world displays. This can be deeply perplexing, and deeply disturbing. It can lead a believer to take towards God an attitude he himself deplores; it can tempt us to be angry with God, to mistrust God, like Job, to accuse him of injustice, to adopt an attitude of bitterness and rebellion. No doubt there isn’t any logical incompatibility between God's power and knowledge and goodness, on the one hand, and the existence of the evils we see on the other; and no doubt the latter doesn't provide a good probabilistic argument against the former. No doubt; but this is cold and abstract comfort when faced with the shocking concreteness of a particularly appalling exemplification of evil. What the believer in the grip of this sort of spiritual perplexity needs, of course, is not philosophy, but comfort, and spiritual counsel. There is much to be said here and it is neither my place nor within my competence to say it

For the hard determinist, sin has more of the features of natural evil than usually supposed, and as a result, God’s causing sin is much more like God’s causing natural evil as it is typically conceived

התועלת הו׳ הוא בדעות להודיע שהשם יתעלה יעשה מה שיעשה מהנפלאות באמצעות הסבות היותר נאיתות שאפשר. ולזה תראה שכאשר רצה השם יתעלה שלא יגיע היזק לישראל מהמצריים עם היותם קרובים מאד להם צוה ישראל שיחרישו ולא ירימו קולם כדי שלא ירגישו המצרים איפה הם מצד קולם ושם הענן מבדיל ביניהם, והיה זה הענן בלילה כדי שלא יראו המצרים בני ישראל קרובים מאד להם ויזיקום אם בחצים אם באופן אחר. וסבב גם כן שיהיה משה אחרון להיותו מושגח יותר כדי שתשלם ההצלה לישראל. והיה זה גם כן שיהיה משה יוצא מן הים אחרון בעבור שיהיה ים סוף נקרע עד שיצאו כלם, וכזה תמצא ביהושע שכאשר עברו ישראל את הירדן יצאו אחרונים מן הירדן הכהנים נושאי ארון ברית ה׳. וסבב גם כן שתתמיד נשיבת רוח קדים עזה כל הלילה כדי שיאות יותר להגלות חלק מה מהים.

. . .

והנה האריך בעניני זה הספור הנפלא לרוב התועלת המגיע ממנו כי זה יורה על חזק השגחת השם יתעלה בדבקים בו אשר האמנה בו הוא פנה מפנות התורה. וכבר יפול ספק מה בענין מופת עמוד האש והענן לפי מה שהשרשנוהו בששי ממלחמות ה׳. וזה שכבר השרשנו שם שהמופתים יהיו בדברים אשר לא ימנע היותם בעצמם מצד הטבע, ואם היה שיהיה נמנע מצד הטבע שיהיו מאלו הסבות שיתחדשו מהם כאלו תאמר כי אע״פ שחדוש הנחש מהמטה הוא נמנע מצד הטבע הנה מציאות הנחש בעצמו איננו נמנע מצד הטבע. וכבר ביארנו שם שכבר השרישו רז״ל זה השרש בענין הנפלאות והוא גם כן מחוייב מצד העיון כמו שבארנו שם. ונאמר כי כבר התבאר בטבעיות שהאיד הקטורי יעלה באמצעות הגרמים השמימיים מבטן הארץ ושהוא יתלהב במעט סיבה ובהיות הענין כן הנה אע״פ שלא ימצא עמוד אש וענן עולה מן הארץ בזה האופן הנה מציאות עמוד אש וענן בזה התואר איננו נמנע מצד עצמותו כי לא ימנע המצא איד קיטורי בזה התואר ולא ימנע התלהבו. והנה כמו שיתחדש מהמטה נחש על דרך מופת כן יתכן שיתחדש מן האויר על דרך מופת איד קיטורי יהיה ממנו עמוד ענן ועמוד אש. ולזאת הסיבה בעינה לא הסכמנו שיהיה מי הים גבוהים משני צדדים ולא יהיו נגדים כי זה הוא נמנע מצד טבע המים. ואמנם מצד אחר הוא אפשר באמצעות הרוח החזק אשר היה דוחה המים תמיד כל הלילה ועל זה אמר וברוח נערמו מים, וכן תמצא ביהושע בענין הירדן אשר עברו בו ישראל שמימיו היו נד אחד מהצד האחד וזה בלי ספק היה באמצעות רוח חזקה הוליך השם יתעלה בדרך מופת לדחות המים אל הצד ההוא בדרך שלא היו נגרים על ישראל ואם לא נזכר זה שם.

ראוי שתדע שזה המופת היה נפלא מאד כי לא יתכן שיתהוה ע״ד הטבע דבר מזה כעת מהעתים כי לא יתהוה מאלו האדים העולים באויר דבר יתכן שיהיה מזון וזה מבואר במעט עיון למי שעיין בטבעיות, והנה עכ״פ יתכן שיהיה מעירוב היסודות והמזג שמה שיהיה טבעו כטבע זה המן אשר ירד להם מן השמים. שאם לא היה הענין כן יהיה מציאות המן נמנע מצד עצמותו ומה שזה דרכו לא יתחדש ע״ד מופת כמו שלא יתחדש ע״ד מופת מציאות מרובע יהיה קטרו שוה לצלעו, וכבר בארנו זה בו׳ ממלחמות ה׳ ושם בארנו זה הענין הוא דעת תורתינו ושהוא מחוייב מצד העיון. והנה היה התהוות המן בזולת סבותיו באופן התהוות מהמטה נחש, ר״ל שאין התהוות המן ומציאותו דבר נמנע מצד עצמותו כמו שאין מציאות הנחש נמנע מצד עצמותו, ואמנם היה נמנע מצד הטבע שיהיה המן מאלו האדים או מהאויר ושיהיה הנחש מהמטה.

The second, and perhaps most radical, example of how far the Rabbis were prepared to go is the case of ir hanidachat,(subversive city) regarding which the Sages used a very far-fetched argument to abolish this biblical law for the sake of a higher morality. Here (Sanhedrin 71a), too, they were convinced that “there never was a condemned city and never will be,” and the law was meant only to convey some important lessons

It is most ingenious how the Sages justified this ruling. They argued that it was impossible to destroy the entire city, since no doubt there must have been mezuzot on the doorposts of some of its inhabitants. (You can be a Jewish idol worshipper, but what Jew doesn’t have a mezuzah on their doorpost?) Since it is forbidden to destroy the name of God, which is found in the mezuzah, and everything in the city had to be utterly destroyed, the law of ir hanidachat could not be enforced and was meant to be purely theoretical

That the mezuzah could be removed before the city would be destroyed was something the Sages did not want to contemplate! They must surely have been aware of this possibility. But since they believed that God could never have meant this law to be applied, they found an extremely far-fetched loophole and based their whole argument on a minor detail, which they could easily have solved and which they knew made little sense. It was deliberate trickery rooted in an unequalled moral awareness

Here, too, Rabbi Yonatan (Ibid.) maintained that he sat on the ruins of such a city and the mezuzot must have been removed beforehand. His arguments in both of these cases seem to be far-fetched, since the Sages must have known about such incidents. Either they were in denial about them or they wished to be in denial, so as not to undermine their viewpoint that these laws never did and never will apply!

Also in the case of the biblical commandment to destroy the nation of Amalek and the seven nations of ancient Canaan at the time that Joshua conquered the land, the Sages found ways to nullify this law and declared it inoperative by claiming that these nations no longer exist. (See Mishnah Yadayim, 4:4; Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 5:4  and Minchat Chinuch by Rabbi Yoseph Babad, Mitzvah: 604.) However, the biblical text indicates that these nations once did exist and were partially destroyed – including women and children – by the Israelites. We have to wonder whether these stories really happened or whether they are purely figurative. Or, that perhaps only the males were killed. Most interesting is the observation in Yoma 22b where Rabbi Mani states that King Shaul argued with God why the Amalekite children had to be killed for the sins of their fathers. King Shaul argued with God as Avraham did when God wanted to destroy Sedom and Amora

Suffering and injustice have forever been part of human experience. Infants die; neighbors rich and poor, good and wicked, are victims of the same disaster; we remain healthy or succumb to illness — all without obvious purpose and often without explanation. But the human animal is distinguished by his or her need for explanations — we want to understand why we suffer, why our worlds are disrupted, why we experience loss. This need to ask "why?" is what lies at the root of the problem of suffering

Suffering is a problem of meaning — of making sense of one's condition. As Clifford Geertz writes, "[T]he problem of suffering is, paradoxically, not how to avoid suffering but how to suffer, how to make of [suffering] . . . something bearable, supportable — something, as we say, sufferable." The variety of experiences we call suffering (such as illness, loss of a loved one, hunger) are to a large degree unavoidable. We would individually like to avoid such suffering, perhaps, but its occurrence is not, of itself, the problem. The problem, again, is that we, as human beings, seek to give meaning and structure to our experience, and suffering is the phenomenon that perhaps most effectively challenges meaning and undermines our sense of order

The diverse human religious systems stand in significant measure as responses to the problem of suffering. They attempt to explain and often justify suffering, giving it meaning and purpose. The sufferer, consequently, may feel that suffering is not entirely arbitrary or, better, that it serves some divine plan. He or she will thus be protected from the threat of anomie which suffering represents, for potential chaos is cast as part of the divine order

from God’s perspective everything, including sin, is part of God’s plan and purpose — including hell. Calvinist Theodore Beza (Calvin’s successor in Geneva): “Those who find themselves suffering in the flames of hell for eternity can at least take comfort in the fact that they are there for the greater glory of God.” Hell is necessary for God’s full self-glorification because God’s self-glorification (God’s purpose in creation) requires that all of his attributes be manifested. One of God’s attributes is justice and wrath, including hell, is necessary for the full manifestation of God’s justice

Arminians make a distinction
between two wills of God: "antecedent" and "consequent." God's antecedent will is what God wishes were the case; God's consequent will is what God permits to be the case. Sin has no place in God's antecedent will; neither does hell. These exist only because of human persons free (not foreordained) rebellion against God and refusal of God's mercy

Nahum Glatzer reviews the major types of interpretation. Some see the final theophany and response as an affirmation that God's ways are a mystery. If humans cannot comprehend God's creation, that is, why should they imagine that they can understand the precise mechanisms of God's justice? Others see Job's response as a claim that only faith may form a proper and adequate answer. The Lord had, after all, challenged Job's adequacy in thinking that he could thus challenge God; Job's final and more proper response was to submit and to believe. Martin Buber and Yehezkel Kaufmann both understand God's answer to be the theophany itself. God's revelation responds perfectly to Job's demand to confront God. What significance is there to his suffering, after all, in light of God's actual presence?

Stephen Geller follows the main thrust of these several interpretations, but with an important clarification. For Geller, Job is a critique of conventional ancient Near Eastern wisdom, which posited that "the laws of human behavior reflected cosmic order." Job declared instead that "there can be no 'science' of piety." The claim "that the moral order is so directly related to nature as to be a part of it, implicitly binding even God, simply is wrong." When Job triumphed,causing God to reveal himself, that revelation sought to communicate the essential difference between the natural order — which is ultimately inscrutable — and the moral order. The system of divine justice is not mechanistic, the author says. God is free from any moral order that we might seek to impose

נראה שהוא ז"ל [הראב"ד] מפרש דהא דאמרינן (יחזקאל כ לח) וברותי מכם המרדים והפושעים בי, אלו בני תשע מדות, כלומר אנשי תשע מדות, כלומר שהבועלים באחת מתשע מדות אלו הם מורדים ופושעים. וכן בדין, שוולד אחת מתשע מדות אלו למה פושע מבטן קורא לו על פשע אביו וחטאתו והוא נקי כפים, אם לא שנאמר שכל שהורתו באחת מאלה סופו להיות מורד ופושע

Maimonides’s description of God as the ‘First Being who brings into being all that exists’ sounds very much like the God of the philosophers, that is, a Prime Mover who is not necessarily concerned with the ongoing operations of the world

ויש דבר מכאיב הלבבות ומדאיב המחשבות ממנו לבדו נמשכו רבים בכל הדורות לכפירה גמורה והוא הראות בעולם משפט מעוקל וצדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו. כי יאמרו מדוע דרך פלוני ופלוני צלחה ולמה פלוני ופלוני שיראו צדיקים אבדו. זה שורש המרי בכל המורדים מכל אומה ולשון.

וכן אסף המשורר ע"ה העיד על עצמו כי המחקר הזה כמעט שהביאו לידי כפירה ונטייה מהאמת אמר ואני כמעט נטיו רגלי כאין שפכה אשורי כי קנאתי בהוללים שלום רשעים אראה, וזו היא תלונתו על רשע וטוב לו, ועל תלונת צדיק ורע לו אמר אך ריק זיכיתי לבבי וארחץ בנקיון כפי ואהי נגוע כל היום ותוכחתי לבקרים.

. . .

ואם השלמים הבהילם המחקר הזה עד שיש מהם מי שהעיר על עצמו שהיה קרוב לנטות לדעת הכופרים מה יעשו ההמון חלושי השכל מעטי התבונה.

. . .

ולהיות הספק הזה כולל לחכמים ולהמון ומה שמביא החכמים אל הספק הזה הוא זולת מה שמביא ההמון אליו חיוב שיהיה זה הספר החוקר בהתרת זה הספק לאנשים חלוקי הדיעות זה אומר בכה וזה אומר בכה, זה מתיר הספק בדרך המוני וזה מתירו בדרך עיוני שכלי וזה אומר בדרך נבואי שימצאו בו תועלת ההמוני והשלם יחד, עם היות שהמקרים הנופלים בבני אדם המבהילים והמפילים הספק הזה הם ממינים רבים והתרת הספק במין אחד הוא זולת התרת הספק במין אחר. וכל זה מחייב אריכות הויכוח כדי שיותרו כל הספיקות במאמר אחר מאמר להמוני ולשלם כל אחד כפי מה שיסבול שכלו וכפי מה שתגדל מבוכתו.

ולפי זאת הסיבה בעצמה בא הסיפור הזה, רצוני לומר ספר איוב ומקריו, בתלונת צדיק ורע לו ובתלונת הצדיק עצמו היודע בעצמו שהוא צדיק, כי זאת היא הקושיא החזקה המבהילה והמחרירה והמביאה לידי נטייה מהאמת וכפירה.

ובאמת שדבריו קרובים אל העיון אלו היתה לנו קבלה בזה שיהיה דעת התורה כן. אבל לפי שהדבר הוא רב הסכנה ראוי לנטות מעליו ולסמוך על דעת האב המורה ז״ל עד יבא ויורה צדק לנו.

שהוא ידוע מהשרשים התורניים שהקטנים אין להם עונש על מעשיהם ומיתתן הוא בעונש אביהם כמו שכתוב (הושע ט יב) כי אם יגדלו את בניהם ושכלתים מאדם, ובכלל ברכות התורה וקללותיה הם פרי הבטן וזה לא ירחיקם השכל כי כמו שנכסי האדם הם קניינו וההצלחה או הפכה בהם הוא נמשך למעשה האדם כן הוא הדין בבנים בעודן קטנים כי הם כאבר אחד מאבריו ותשיגם טובה או רעה בשביל אביהם.

Another situation that reveals the centrality of community in halakhah is that of prayer. On one level, halakhah includes statements affirming the spontaneous features of prayer: "Make not thy prayer a fixed routine but let it be beseeching and entreaty before God" (M. Avot 2:13). On another level halakhah instituted fixed times and text and, hence, formalized the "service of the heart."

For Maimonides as well as for Soloveitchik, the overriding constraint of community welfare led to the formulation of a fixed language of prayer; the philosopher, the poet, and the simple inarticulate Jew are bidden to stand before God at the same time and to address God with the same words. Were community not central to Jewish spirituality, prayer would have remained the spontaneous outpouring of each individual jew, with its length, form, and time differing according to the needs and abilities of every individual

ולא יניח ה' נין ונכד לעמלק הייינו בעושה מעשה עמלק, וכדאמרו ע"ז י: בקרא ולא יהיה שריד לבית עשיו בעושה מעשה עשיו.

האם יהודים דתיים אמורים ללכת את המייל הנוסף הזה ולהעמיד את הא–ל מעל הלוגיקה? תשובתם של כל הראשונים לשאלה זו היא שלילית בהחלט: ה"נמנעות" אינן בתוך תחום היכולת הא–לוהית.

מתפלספים קיצוניים כמו רבי משה נרבוני השמיעו רמזים עבים לכך שהצדק עם אריסטו לגמרי, שכל סתירה פיסיקלית היא סתירה לוגית [וממילא מן הנמנע אף ממנו ית׳ כביכול], ועוררו עליהם את זעמם של שלומי אמוני ישראל.

כן הוא דרך התורה לצייר לנו הטובות והרעות כיורדות מלמעלה בכוונה לשכר ולעונש, אף אם הן נמשכות ובאות בדרך הטבע לפי מנהגו של עולם... וכמו שלאיים על בני ישראל אמרה תורה כי ה' אל קנא ונוקם ובעל חימה, כך אמרה ג"כ שהוא פוקד עון אבות על בנים כאילו הוא עושה זה דרך נקמה וחרון אף, גם כי באמת לא יקרה הדבר אלא בדרכי הטבע ולא לנקמה חלילה, אלא הכל לטובת בני אדם.

כי אצל עמלק כשמתעורר השגחתו ית׳ בעולם הוא למיטתו כי היא היפך סדר הבריאה שכולה היתה בשביל ישראל שקבלו התורה ולולי הם חזר העולם לתוהו ובוהו.

. . .

וקיום העולם הוא במחיית עמלק לגמרי דע״ז רמז לו במ״ש פקדתי וגו׳ דלשון זה משמעותו השגחה בקיום העולם וכשהשי״ת משגיח בעולמו ורואה את עמלק מגיע משפט ההשגחה להאבידו שבזה יתקיים העולם לגמרי.

The command is to literally write what has been erased from memory, to remember, but to remember forgetfully

Fundamentally, the idea of Amalek is an attempt to make some theological sense of recurring historical evils. While such theologies are potentially dangerous, they also serve a purpose by helping communities survive and explain troubling historical events. In Judaism, the theological idea that massive historical evils perpetrated by individuals and groups who harbor an irrational hatred of Jews and Judaism are part of a larger cosmic pattern has helped the community make sense of tragedies and thus continue to survive

מי אני

ובנוגע נסים במשנתו של הרמב״ם איז אינטרעסאנט צוצוצייכענען צו וואס דר. מנחם קעלנער טענה׳ט (עפ״י דר. זאב פארבּער) אז ס׳איז מעגליך אז דער רמב״ם האט נישט געהאלטן אז דאס ברענען אכט טעג פון די ליכט אשר בעבורה נתקן חנוכה איז געווען א נס ממש.

וגם לפי׳ הב׳ שכתבתי למעלה שצוה המלך באגרות השניות שהיהודים ישלחו ידם ויהרגו את המורדים במלך קרובי המן ומשפחת עמלק, אמר כאן נקהלו היהודים לשלוח יד במבקשי רעתם משפחת המן ועמלק שמעולם בקשו רעתם כדכתיב ויבא עמלק, ואיש אחר שלא מזרע עמלק לא עמד בפניהם למחות בידם לפי שכל העולם היו שונאים אותם לפי שהיו רוצים להשתרר עליהם.

ותועי רוח שאלו איך אמר הכתוב לא יומתו אבות על בנים ובמקום אחר אומר (שמות כ ה) פוקד עון אבות, ושאלתם תהו כי לא יומתו אבות על בנים מצוה על ישראל ופוקד עון אבות על בנים הוא הפוקד

שהענינים אשר נחקור עליהם אם הם נמצאים לשם ית׳ או הם נשללים ממנו, הוא מבואר שאנחנו נשפט על הנשואים ההם בכוונה אחת בעינה בחיוב ובשלילה. והמשל שנחקור אם השי״ת גשם או איננו גשם, הוא מבואר ששם הגשם הוא מורה אצלנו הוראה אחת באופן מה בשתי החלוקות האלו, וזה שאם היה שם הגשם נאמר אצלנו בחלק השולל מאלו החלקים בשתוף גמור עם מה שיאמר עליו בחלק המחייב, לא היו אלו החלוקות חלקי הסותר אצל מחשבתנו, וזה מבואר בנפשו. והמשל שכמו שלא יאמר אחד הנה אחקור אם הכותל גשם או איננו מראה, כן לא יאמר זה אם הניח שם אחד לגשם ולמראה, כי לא תהיינה כמו אלו החלוקות חלקי הסותר. ובהיות הענין כן, והיה מבואר שהדברים הנמצאים, כשנשללם מהשי״ת, לא יורה אצלנו הנשוא ההוא בו ית׳ ובנו בשתוף הגמור, כן הענין במה שנחייבהו לו מן הדברים הנמצאים לנו. והמשל שאנחנו נאמר בשם ית׳ שהוא בלתי מתנועע, לפי שאם היה מתנועע היה גשם, כי זה הוא דבר מחויב במתנועע במה שהוא מתנועע. והוא מבואר ששם המתנועע בזאת הגזרה איננו נאמר עם המתנועע אשר יאמר במה שאצלנו בשתוף גמור, שאם היה הענין כן לא היתה בכאן ראיה שיהיה השי״ת בלתי מתנועע, כי המתנועע אשר חויב בו שיהיה גשם הוא המתנועע אשר יאמר במה שאצלנו, אבל המתנועע הנאמר עמו בשתוף גמור לא יחויב בו שיהיה גשם. ובהיות הענין כן, והיה מבואר שהנשואים אשר נשללם מהשי״ת אינן נאמרים בו ית׳ ובנו בשתוף גמור, הוא מבואר שהנשואים אשר נחייבם לו ית׳ אינם נאמרים בו ית׳ ובנו בשתוף גמור, כי היו אלו הנשואים לי מחשבתנו תחלה בספק, אם יחויבו לו ית׳ או ישוללו ממנו, עד ששלמה החקירה לנו ואז חייבנום או שללנום ממנו. ובכלל אם היו הדברים אשר נחייבם לו ית׳ נאמרים בו ית׳ ובנו בשתוף גמור, לא יהיה כאן שם משמות הדברים אשר אצלנו שיהיה יותר ראוי בשוללות השי״ת מבחיוב, ובחיוב מבשוללות. וזה כי לאומר שיאמר, דרך משל, שהשי״ת הוא גשם ולא ירצה בזה הגשם דבר בעל כמה, אבל דבר הוא משותף שתוף גמור עם מה שנקראהו גשם, וכן יאמר כי השי״ת בלתי יודע, לפי ששם הידיעה לא יורה אצלו בזה המאמר על מה שיורה עליו במה שנקראהו ידיעה. ואין לאומר שיאמר כי אנחנו אמנם נשלול ממנו הגשמות להיות חסרון לנו, ונחייב הידיעה להיותה שלמות. וזה כי אין שם הגשמות חסרון, והוא אשר נשללהו ממנו, אבל ענינו והראיה שאם היינו מורים בשם הגשמות על מה שיורה עליו שם הידיעה, ובשם הידיעה על מה שיורה עליו שם הגשמות, היה הגשמות שלמות לנו והידיעה חסרון. ועוד שאנחנו לא נחייב לשם ית׳ דבר ולא נשללהו ממנו, אלא כשנחקור תחלה אם מציאות הדבר ההוא ראוי לו ית׳ או בלתי ראוי, לא נשים חקירתנו בזה אם הוא שלמות לנו או בלתי שלמות לנו. ובהיות הענין כן, הוא מבואר שהעיון ירחיק שיהיה שם הידיעה נאמר בו ית׳ ובנו בשתוף גמור.

השגחה הפרטית ר״ל השגחת אישי המין שהוא יסוד מיסודי התורה ועמוד שהשכל תלוי בו, ודע כי כל המאמין בהשגחה ומקימה כפי שכלו מקים כל התורה כולה והכופר בה כופר בכל התורה כולה.

א״כ עיר היוצאת לא תשאיר כי אם אחד או שנים שתמצא בהם ההשגחה.

Neither am I intending to disparage the long history of interpretation that exalts Abraham for his response in the Aqedah. Indeed, I respect that tradition. So when I titled part 3 of this book "Unbinding the Aqedah from the Straitjacket of Tradition," this was not intended as an insult. In biblical interpretation, no one comes to any text traditionless. Every reader is shaped by a whole series of prior readings and assumptions - and I am certainly no different. It would be impossible for me to offer an alternative reading of the Aqedah without standing on the shoulders of multitudinous others, who have already grappled with its meaning, and whose grappling I respect

Yet the question must be asked whether the tradition of prior interpretations of the Aqedah (each dependent on their particular historical context and the assumptions and interests of the interpreters) should act as a straitjacket, preventing new and fresh readings of the text. I believe they should not. Hence I have attempted to "unbind" the Aqedah from the limitations of traditional readings

However, I agree entirely with Walter Moberly that new readings of the Aqedah (especially any that are critical of Abraham) need to be grounded in careful, contextual exegesis and not simply in the predilections of the interpreter. Not only am I fully on board with Moberly here, this is precisely what I have attempted to do in this book. Here I am also following the classic advice concerning Scripture given in the Mishnah by the Hebrew sage with the endearing name of Ben Bag Bag: "Turn it over, and [again] turn it over, for all is therein. And look into it. And become gray and old therein. And do not move away from it, for you have no better portion than it."

My motivation is that a fresh encounter with this ancient text, from a new angle, raising new considerations, might not only illuminate its meaning but renew our experience of the God whom Jews and Christians believe may be encountered precisely through this text

the book of Job makes the profound statement that a rationalistic orthodoxy which seeks to have the relationship of God's justice to suffering and evil neatly packaged is also inappropriate

Whereas theodicy texts in the classical tradition take the form of apologetics and attempt to defend God's justice, biblical theodicy texts take the form of prayer (or at least alternate between prayer and other forms of complaint) and question, even assail, God's justice. Whereas in classical theodicy God is discussed abstractly in the third person and the apologist is expected to answer to others about God, in biblical theodicy God is addressed in direct second person speech and is expected to answer the supplicant. Whereas classical theodicy results, I have argued, in deception about the nature of evil and leads to passivity vis-à-vis the status quo, biblical theodicy is radically honest about evil, is rooted in passion, and
questions the present social arrangements in the world

Biblical theodicy, therefore, is not content with contemplation - neither the rational contemplation of philosophical arguments nor the contemplation of prayer, even lament. Such theodicy thus moves from lament, not only to thanksgiving and praise (that is, to celebration and anticipation of God's coming shalom), but also to discipleship and ethical action - to practical engagement with the world animated by a vision of that shalom

I do not think it is mere coincidence that the one place where Plato attempts to resolve the theodicy problem is in the Republic (Book II, 377b-380c), where its function is precisely to legitimate social control in the ideal commonwealth by preventing questioning of divine justice

The Hebrew attitude towards the apparent existence of evil in the world has generally been to adopt the principle that the individual ought not to deny his own experience

It is thus difficult to resist the conclusion that the theodicy problem constitutes a rational aporia, which itself exacerbates the problem of evil for those who are interested - as I am - in theological rationality. This suggests one final criticism that may be made about the greater good defense (a criticism which may apply equally to process theodicy), namely, that it takes rationality far too seriously, privileging the deliverances of first-order logic over the testimony of both experience and the Scriptures. If indeed we are confronted with the dilemma of either 1) concocting a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil in order to render God's goodness and power logically compatible with the existence of evil, thus "solving" the theodicy problem, or 2) rejecting entirely the possibility of its rational solution, I believe we must choose the latter. For why must we have rational consistency at all costs? Logic is certainly an important value, but is it the most important value in all situations? (In particular, two considerations may be advanced in support of not holding fast to logical consistency in the case of theodicy. The first is that language about God is typically subject, as Ian Ramsey has extensively shown, to what he calls "logical impropriety" or oddness. That is, our speech about God is not always subject to standard logical rules (Ramsey 1957:53, 103, 105, 110, 123, et passim). This, combined with the consideration that evil may well be absurd, and thus ultimately inexplicable, converges on an aporetic conclusion to the theodicy problem.) Perhaps, like Job, who even after his encounter with God received no rational justification of his sufferings , we need to live with a healthy dose of agnosticism concerning theodicy

This does not mean that we should never grapple intellectually with the problem of evil. There is certainly no scriptural or other warrant for heading off a budding theodicist at the pass with a priori warning that the way is blocked. Indeed, the example of Job suggests that the aporetic nature of the theodicy problem is something to be learned by experience, through genuine struggle, and not proclaimed at the outset by fiat. Rational attempts to solve the problem of evil, like the torturous process of Job's lament, may be the only way to come to an honest understanding of the logical insolubility of the problem, in much the same way as Job - through the crucible of his experience - came to an acknowledgement of the inscrutability of the ways of God. The only warning sign necessary for an intrepid traveler is the rigorous condition that, like Job, one speak the truth about God, and - I would add - about evil

More of the argument’s force is lost when one recognizes that one’s feeling that God’s existence cannot be compatible with the apparently gratuitous evils that obtain in our world is not by itself worth anything unless it unpacks in arguments that are sound and valid

No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children