א נחמה פאר א צעבראכענעם אבל - וועקער 18

For it seems a greater miracle if God always governs the world with one and the same fixed and immutable order, than if, on account of human folly, he abrogates the laws which (as only one thoroughly blinded could deny) he himself has most excellently decreed in nature, from sheer freedom.

God created Nature so ineffective and prescribed for her laws and rules so barren that he is often constrained to come once more to her rescue if he wants her to be preserved, and the course of events to be as he desires. This I consider to be utterly divorced from reason.

God’s decrees and commandments, and consequently God’s providence, are in truth nothing but Nature’s order; that is to say, when Scripture tells us that this or that was accomplished by God or by God’s will, nothing more is intended than that it came about by accordance with Nature’s law and order, and not, as the common people believe, that Nature for some period has ceased to act, or that for some time its order has been interrupted.

Spinoza’s naturalistic understanding of divine providence in the Treatise can also accommodate, in some sense, an important feature of the common religious view of providence, namely, that which sees God as managing a system of rewards and punishments. The providential God of the Abrahamic traditions ensures that, at least in the very long run, human virtue and vice receive their just deserts. This is the moral dimension of providence directed at individuals that earlier Jewish philosophers called “special providence,” to distinguish it from the “general providence” that runs through the laws of nature and endows each species with characteristics essential for survival (for example, rationality in human beings or speed in gazelles). What Spinoza cannot allow, however, is that there is a distribution of rewards for virtue carried out by an intelligent moral agent, a kind of person, freely and actively dispensing them from on high.

In the Ethics, Spinoza shows that the virtuous person pursues and acquires true and adequate ideas, a deep rational understanding of Nature and its ways. As we have seen, this intellectual knowledge, unlike information that comes by way of the senses or the imagination, provides insight into the essences of things and especially the ways in which they depend necessarily on their highest causes in Nature. Spinoza insists that this knowledge of God or Nature and how things relate to it is of the greatest benefit to a human being in two ways.

First, he suggests that an understanding of Nature’s essences and laws provides the virtuous individual with the tools needed to navigate life’s obstacle course. The ways of Nature are transparent to the intellectually perfected person. His capacity to manipulate things and avoid dangers is greater than that of the person who is governed by the senses and imagination and thus subject to chance and whatever may happen. The virtuous person has greater control over events; others are more at the mercy of luck. A deep knowledge of things benefits one in this very practical manner.

Second, and more important, true knowledge is, for the virtuous person, the source of an abiding happiness and peace of mind that is resistant to the vicissitudes of fortune. When a person understands Nature, he sees the necessity of all things, and especially the fact that the objects that he values are, in their comings and goings, not under his control. More precisely, he sees, for example, that all bodies and their states and relationships - including the condition of his own body - follow necessarily from the essence of matter (Extension) and the universal laws of physics; and he sees that all ideas, including all the properties of minds, follow necessarily from the essence of Thought and its universal laws.

Such insight can only weaken the power that the irrational passions have over an individual. Herein lie the natural benefits or rewards of virtue. When a person achieves a high level of understanding of Nature and realizes that he cannot control what it brings his way or takes from him, he becomes less anxious over things, less governed by the affects of hope and fear over what may or may not come to pass. No longer obsessed with or despondent over the loss of his possessions, he is less likely to be overwhelmed with emotions at their arrival and passing away. Such a person will regard all things with an even temper and will not be inordinately and irrationally affected in different ways by past, present, or future events. His life will be tranquil and not given to sudden disturbances of the passions. The result is self-control and a calmness of mind.

The more this knowledge that things are necessary is concerned with singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the Mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that Sadness over some good which has perished is lessened as soon as the man who has lost it realizes that this good could not, in any way, have been kept. Similarly, we see that [because we regard infancy as a natural and necessary thing] no one pities infants because of their inability to speak, to walk, or to reason, or because they live so many years, as it were, unconscious of themselves.

What Spinoza calls the “free person” - the virtuous individual who “lives according to the dictate of reason alone” - bears the gifts and losses of fortune with equanimity, does only those things that he believes to be “the most important in life,” refuses to chase after or be anxious about ephemeral goods, and is not overly concerned with death. His understanding of his place in the natural scheme of things brings him happiness and true peace of mind.

Virtue, then, has its rewards. The natural consequence of the striving for and acquisition of understanding and knowledge is well-being. Our freedom, our physical and psychological flourishing are directly dependent on our knowledge of Nature, including our understanding both of the necessity of all things and of our place in the world. Virtue is a source of an abiding happiness that is free from chance. Such is the true but entirely natural benefit of virtue. This, if anything, constitutes a special kind providence within Spinoza’s system, one that is available only to rational beings.

אני אומר באמונה שלימה
שהתפלות קדמו לאלקים.
התפלות יצרו את האלקים
האלקים יצר את האדם
והאדם יוצר תפלות
שיוצרות את אלקים שיוצר את האדם.

Leaman has set up a strawman as the Jewish philosophers' God, wrongly taking them to believe in a being of absolute omniscience and omnipotence (as well as unqualified benevolence, which they did accept).

Levi Ben Gerson’s solution [over what constitutes God’s Knowledge and its extent], whatever we may think of its scientific or philosophic value, is surely very bold as theology, we might almost say it’s a theological monstrosity.

שהדברים אשר ירצם האלוק יעשו בהכרח ואין שם מונע ימנע מהעשות רצונו, אלא שהוא ית' לא ירצה אלא אפשר, ולא כל אפשר - אלא מה שגזרה חכמתו להיות כך.

Maimonides' absolute transcendence concept of [the] deity is made more explicit by drawing the full implications of the above statements and concretizing them with specific examples. Thus denying that God in any way is an object of human knowledge means that there is no being called God that the human person can understand or believe in. The very statement "God exists" is empty of content [1:56] since the human mind has no idea of the entity referred to, and even if it did, would not know what existence in the case of such an entity means. Moreover, the fact that God has no relation to any being other than Himself, and can be affected by no other being means, for example, that when humans pray they do not encounter God, or enter into any other relation with Him, and their prayers produce no effect upon Him. Furthermore, one cannot even say that God is aware of the human race - let alone that He intervenes in human affairs - since knowledge of humans entails entering into an epistemological relation with them. Similarly, God cannot be considered the "father" of human persons, a common liturgical notion, but a relation that Maimonides explicitly denies exists between deity and any of his creatures (1:52). Finally, since God has no emotions He cannot be said to possess a quality such as mercy or compassion for His creatures, emotions commonly attributed to God in the Bible.

Absolute transcendence, one must bear in mind, puts forth a concept of [a] deity who is completely unknowable, who relates to nothing other than Himself, who cannot be said to know of humans or exercise providence over them, who cannot be related to through prophecy, prayer, or other actions, and who cannot be called upon in time of distress.

...

The absolute transcendence concept of deity implies both the belief that God is not aware of humans and that He does not dispense reward and punishment to them. Maimonides states that the former belief disheartens pious persons and the latter belief leads to social disorder (III:19, 17; cf. 11:23). Accordingly, since the absolute transcendence concept has potentially destructive social consequences it must be withheld from the multitude.

כן המציא דבר מגושם לא מחומר כלל הוא מכת האפשר אצלנו ומכת הנמנע אצל הפילוסופים. וכן יאמרו הפילוסופים שהמציא מרובע שאלכסונו כצלעו או זוית מגושמת שיקיפו בה ארבע זוית פשוטות נצבות וכיוצא בהם - כל אלה מכת הנמנע; וקצת מי שיסכול החכמות הלימודיות ולא ידע מאלה הענינים רק המלות לבד לא ציור ענין יחשבם אפשריים.

Maimonides is not saying that God is vindictive, or that God singles out individuals for punishment. In Maimonides’ view, Divine Providence is consequent upon the perfection of human intellect and reflects the causal and ontological grid whereby God orders reality. In this respect it differs from [the fifth view in Ch. 17] which did not emphasize the importance of intellectual perfection.

The first distinction must be raised before we even begin to address the problem of evil as a challenge to theism. This is the distinction between the philosophical problem of evil and what we may call the existential problem of evil. When philosophers talk about the problem of evil, they are discussing an argument – or, to be more precise, a family of arguments – against the existence of God, taking evil as the starting point. It is argued that the existence, amount, magnitude, or distribution of evil renders God’s existence impossible or unlikely. So the philosophical problem of evil concerns certain arguments against God’s existence. The existential problem of evil is more pervasive than the philosophical problem. Many people who rarely think about arguments at all are faced with this problem. The existential problem of evil is not an argument but a challenge. The challenge can be phrased in the form of a question: how can I make sense out of my life given the evil that I suffer or that I witness? Each human being encounters or, at least, is aware of significant evil and thus faces the existential problem of evil. I face the existential problem of evil when I am facing real suffering. I think about the philosophical problem when I have the luxury of sitting back and theorizing about evil. It is rare that someone in the middle of deep suffering will spin an argument against God. He might cry out against God or for God, but there is generally little structuring of arguments going on.

It is important to make this distinction, because adequate answers to these problems will be very different from one another. An answer to the philosophical problem of evil will require that we pay careful attention to the details of various arguments. We shall analyze them and try to find the various strengths and weaknesses in them. This kind of academic work is not directly relevant to a person in the throes of suffering. When a person faces the existential problem of evil, she is not concerned with arguments at all. An answer to the existential problem of evil will be very personal. If I provide a detailed refutation of some argument to a person when she is struggling with her own experience of evil, I will miss her need entirely. We can help each other through difficulties by expressing our deep concern and by extending a listening ear and by providing what might be called pastoral care. It may be that either of these problems – or their combination – is at the heart of a person’s rejection of theism.

In support of the thesis that God’s knowledge of particulars extends equally to providence, it can be argued that God withholds providence when God knows that I am distracted. On this reading, my suffering or benefiting from providence is the direct result of God’s knowledge of me qua particular. This position is supported by the statement that “outside the mind nothing exists except individuals . . . consequently providence watches only over these individuals” (GP 3.18). I suggest that this reading is more consistent with Maimonides’ own statements pertaining to the extent of divine omniscience. But, of course, we are left with two problems: first of all, God is ultimately responsible for the suffering of the righteous, and secondly, God’s providence, coupled with His omniscience, do affect my ability (yekholet) to board or not board the ship. On this reading, humans do not have free choice in light of God’s knowledge of future contingent events.

The resolution of the prima facie tension between God’s justice and apparent disorder in the distribution of flourishing is to be found in the generality of God’s ways – or, more particularly, in the universal and lawlike order that God has established in nature. When we see a virtuous person suffer, it is not because God has directly chosen to inflict punishment on this individual, with an ad hoc intention; his suffering is not the result of what Philo calls “immediate providence” (kata pronoian). Rather, his suffering is a result of the general manner in which nature works. God’s providential ways are not directed toward the well-being of particular individuals but to the overall well-being of the system and the general welfare of creatures. Thus, it may sometimes happen that an operation of nature that is, on the whole, for the best (and was chosen by God for that reason) has consequences that, from the perspective of one individual or another, are not optimal. God looks to the goodness of the whole, not its particular constituents, some of whom may (unjustly, it seems) get swept along by the course of events.

In pestilential diseases, it is necessary that some of those who are not guilty should be involved in the destruction . . . It is inevitable that those who are exposed to a pestilential atmosphere must become diseased just as all persons who are exposed to a storm on board a ship must all be exposed to equal danger.

God does not intend for the virtuous individual to suffer; his suffering is, in this sense, “accidental,” one of “the results and consquences of the operations of nature.” Indeed, it is the person himself who is to blame for his suffering, because it is his responsibility to take care within the course of nature and be on guard against any disasters that may be coming his way. Later Jewish thinkers will demonstrate how the pursuit of virtue does, in fact, afford one some relief and protections from the vicissitudes of nature.

One possible, even natural way of conceiving the divine modus operandi in providence for Maimonides needs to be ruled out from the start. There are passages in which Maimonides speaks as if God, seeing the virtues and vices of particular human beings, actively and intentionally chooses to reward and punish them as individuals – perhaps in just the way that the multitude think of providence, with God sending a thunder bolt against one person while snatching another person from the jaws of death (e.g., in the lions’ den). Thus, just as Maimonides insists that the people are on board the ship because of the “divine will in accordance with the deserts of those people as determined in His judgments,” so he elsewhere notes how the fate met by many people is “due not to neglect and the withdrawal of providence, but was a punishment for those men because they deserved what befell them.” It is clear that this anthropomorphic way of acting, with God intervening to save or punish a person as if through a miracle, is inconsistent with what Maimonides considers the proper conception of God; such language may be only an element of Maimonides’ exoteric (vs. esoteric) writing, geared for the philosophically unsophisticated reader.

Rather, God’s role in providence is, so to speak, much more passive. God has put a system in place that is there for individual human beings to take advantage of or not, as they choose. It is the virtuous – understood as those who pursue intellectual virtue, and not merely moral virtue – who choose to do so, whereas all others are left without its protection.

Maimonides distinguishes between general providence, which is constituted by the species’ characteristics oriented to its preservation and is (barring unusual circumstances) provided equally to all member of the species, and individual providence, which is particularized to individuals and distributed only according to merits. Both varieties of providence are understood in highly naturalistic and Aristotelian terms. The latter, however, comes into play only in the realm of human agency.

. . .

‏Despite Maimonides’ claim that the suffering of many is “due not to neglect and the withdrawal of providence, but was a punishment for those men because they deserved what befell them,” it seems clear that it is precisely through approach and withdrawal – that is, the human being’s willful approaching to and withdrawing from the overflow – that providence operates. As long as one is actively enjoying the epistemic connection to the divine overflow, one is ipso facto protected; providence is watching over such a person. On the other hand, when one is not attending to God (either because one has never made the effort or because, having achieved the connection, one has temporarily become distracted, perhaps by the pleasures of the senses), one is abandoned to chance and left to one’s own devices. The person who is not experiencing the overflow is not enjoying its benefits. He is at the mercy of nature’s elements and his well-being is subject to whatever may or may not come his way. Providence is no longer watching over him – not because God is actively punishing him, but because through his own actions he has taken himself outside of the care that providence (the overflow) offers.

. . .

There is some ambiguity as to just what is the nature of the protection that, according to Maimonides, divine providence provides. Commentators, from Maimonides’ time onward, have found a tension between two ways of reading his account. On one reading, what the knowledge brought to the human intellect by the divine overflow gives to the righteous person is a way actually to escape the evils around him. The overflow carries information about nature, among other things, just the kind of understanding that allows an individual to successfully navigate his way around the obstacles to his well-being that the world presents. Thus, a person who has perfected his intellect in the proper way will know not to get on the doomed ship (e.g., because he knows a storm is coming). At one point Maimonides says of the intellectually perfected person that “no evil at all will befall him.” If he should find himself in the midst of a pitched battle, then “even if one thousand were killed to your left and ten thousand to your right, no evil at all would befall you.”

On another reading, however, the person who attends to God, while not literally avoiding the evils that naturally come his way – especially the physical evils of the first kind and the moral evils of the second kind, which tend to be due to circumstances well beyond one’s control – will be less troubled by them. His mind is fixated on the true and lasting good, and he becomes immune to the lure of mutable goods and inured to the travails of his body. He has achieved a lasting state of spiritual well-being and happiness, one that is not subject to the vagaries of chance. Maimonides says that this is the condition of Job at the end of the story. In his first speech, as Maimonides reads it, Job adopts the Aristotelian view: God is not watching over individuals and is causing suffering for no good reason at all, “because of his contempt for the human species and abandonment of it.” After God has spoken, however, Job achieves a state of understanding: “He knew God with a certain knowledge, he admitted that true happiness, which is the knowledge of the deity, is guaranteed to all who know Him and that a human being cannot be troubled in it by any of all the misfortunes in question.” It is not that the good person experiences no loss or harm in his life; after all, Job lost practically everything. Rather, consumed with his bond with God and possessing true happiness, he cares less about those losses. He may see evils in his lifetime, but they will not constitute an “affliction” for him. The lesson Maimonides sees here is a Stoic one.

On either reading, providence does not consist in the active and willful intervention of God in human affairs; it is not that God chooses in particular to reward the person who has united himself to the overflow. Rather, somewhat naturalistically, the knowledge acquired by the virtuous person through the overflow affords him an advantage in the world. “The overflow of the divine intellect . . . guides the actions of righteous men, and perfects the knowledge of excellent men with regard to what they know.”

. . .

When the bond with the overflow is broken, the virtuous person is no better off than the wicked person. They are both on their own, abandoned to the world, come what may.

Yet an impediment may prevent from some time [the overflow] reaching the excellent and good man in question, or again it was not obtained at all by such and such imperfect and wicked man, and therefore the chance occurrences that befell them happened.

Full responsibility for the disconnection from the divine overlow lies with the individual, not God: “It is clear that we are the cause of this ‘hiding of the face,’ and we are the agents who produce this separation.”

Similarly, the prosperity of the wicked person is not a true flourishing, because this person is not enjoying the highest good, intellectual perfection. Moreover, the prosperity that has come his way is totally undeserved and does not represent a reward from God for anything he has done. Rather, being unprotected and at the mercy of nature, it so happens that chance has brought some apparently fine things his way. His possession and enjoyment of them is equally subject to fortune and certain to be short-lived.

See, I ask you, how the matter has turned out in the end! Among so many conveniences in nature they had to find many inconveniences: storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc. These, they maintain, happen because the Gods (whom they judge to be of the same nature as themselves) are angry on account of wrongs done to them by men, or on account of sins committed in their worship. And though their daily experience contradicted this, and though infinitely many examples showed that conveniences and inconveniences happen indiscriminately to the pious and the impious alike, they did not on that account give up their longstanding prejudice. It was easier for them to put this among the other unknown things, whose use they were ignorant of, and so remain in the state of ignorance in which they had been born, than to destroy that whole construction, and think up a new one. So they maintained it as certain that the judgments of the Gods far surpass man’s grasp.

מי אני

אגב, מיט דעם קען מען בעצם צאמשטעלן די דאקטרין פון נמנע הנמנעות וואס נעמט דאס יא אן בעצם, היפך הרמב״ם, עם שיטתו בענין העדר שני הפכים בנושא אחד וברגע אחד. והיינו, אז וויבאלד עס איז לגמרי נישט שייך דן צו זיין דערויף, איז אין פראקטיש זאגן זיי ביידע בעצם די זעלבע זאך; ס׳איז נישט מער ווי א חילוק אין סימענטיקס.

מי אני

איז ראשית כל איז סתם אזוי אינטרעסאנט צו באמערקן אז אין אנהויב פ׳ חלק וואו דער רמב״ם איז מבאר די דרייצן עיקרי אמונה דערמאנט ער נישט קיין איינמאל די ווארט ״יכול״ אדער ״יכולת״ פונקט אזוי אויך נישט. נאר פארשטייט זיך אז דאס איז שוין ״געדרינגען״ פונעם ערשטן עיקר (צי פון דעם פיפטען).

כקבוץ החיוב והשלילה או כמציאות שני הפכים בעת ונושא אחד שלא יתואר השם ביכולת עליו כמו שלא יתואר בשיכול להפסיד את עצמו או לברא כמותו או לעשות מרובע שיהיה קטרו שוה לצלעו, ומה שדומה לזה מהנמנעות אשר להם טבע קיים ואינה מפעולת פועל.

But in the most serious passages we get the single rational God who is all good but not all powerful. Evil is not caused by God - it’s the stuff outside the remit of the rational deity. So in a stroke Plato has solved the Problem of Evil; he has a God that is all good but not all powerful.

The emphasis on the connection between God and humans is a significant feature that distinguishes Gersonides’ theology from deism. A deist can hold that God creates a world in which reward and punishment for human actions are built into the system, as it were, but not that he enters into a relationship with humans. God, on that view, may be likened to a parent who goes away on vacation leaving her children with a detailed series of instructions, money for food, baby-sitter, and so on, but without the phone number where she can be reached. Even if she is able to provide for total supervision of their activities, with the appropriate rewards and punishments, the children will lack the contact that, some say, is essential for their well being. Gersonides’ theory of “particular,” that is providential, knowledge supplies the element of contact that is essential to the biblical conception of God knowing humans. Not only are reward and punishment built into the world, as it were, but so is a direct connection with its author.

ובכלל כל התורה והנביאים מלאים מזה, רצוני שאיש לא ישא כלל עונש מאת ה׳ בעון איש זולתו, כי זהו יושר, א״כ מה נעשה לאמרנו פקד עון אבות על בנים, א״כ ח״ו יהיה הא-ל עושה עול?

התשובה ע״ז, גזירת פוקד עון אבות על בנים אין פירושה כמו שהניחו המפרשים מענין נקימה, אבל זכירה כמו וה׳ פקד את שרה, ובכלל כי פקד בכל המקרא אינו רק כמו זכר, כי הם שמות נרדפים גמורים, ואע״פ שיהיה כפירוש המפרשים, לא יהיה היזק בזה כמו שנבאר עוד. אבל האמת הוא שהטעם כי הא-ל זוכר ענין האבות בהגיע זמן הבנים, וחלילה שיאמר הכתוב שמדותיו ית׳ שהוא ישיא עונש כלל על הבנים מצד עון אבותם, אבל אומר שהוא ית' זוכר עון אבות על ראותו ענין הבנים בבואם אל המעשים, כלומר כי הוא ית׳ הצופה והמביט כל הדורות בראותו הבנים בבוא זמנם, ועתה הוא יזכור אז מה שחלף מן האבות בדורות שעברו העוברים, כי הכל אצלו גלוי וידוע בפעל, רצוני, בקודם יודע המתאחר, ובמתאחר יודע הקודם, ולכן בבא הבנים ויהיו בנים משחיתים, הנה לפניו ית׳ נזכר ומשיג בפעל ענינם, וידע שהאבות היו סבה פועלת ומניעה לעון הבנים, או לעונש שהם סובלים, כי הם החטיאו אותם כמו שמבואר בכל המשלים הכתובים במקרא.

The argument can be formulated as follows (Morriston 2001: 144). Consider some particularly evil state of affairs, E, such as every sentient being suffering excruciating pain throughout its entire existence.

Then:

1) If any being is necessarily morally perfect, then there is no possible world at which that being brings about E

2) If any being is omnipotent, then that being has the power to bring about E

3) If any being has the power to bring about E, then there is some possible world at which that being brings about E

Therefore,

4) No being is both necessarily morally perfect and omnipotent

Some theists have simply accepted the conclusion, replacing either necessary moral perfection or omnipotence with some weaker property. For instance, Nelson Pike famously argued that, although no being would deserve the title “God” unless that being were morally perfect, there are nevertheless possible worlds in which the being who is in fact God is not morally perfect, and therefore is not God (Pike 1969). Pike’s view is, in essence, a rather complicated version of the claim that God is only contingently morally perfect, a view which some have regarded as extremely objectionable from a theological standpoint (Geach 1977).

But if not for the atheist, for whom is an argument from evil a "problem"?

Perhaps the theist. The theist, however, may rightly find the premises or inferences of arguments from evil dubious and hence no problem at all. Perhaps, then, an argument from evil is a problem for the theist who finds all its premises and inferences compelling. But even then it might not be a problem, since she might have more compelling grounds to reject the conclusion than to accept all the premises and inferences. Perhaps, then, an argument from evil is a problem for the theist who finds all its premises and inferences compelling and who has lousy grounds for believing theism and she knows it. In that case an argument from evil might be a problem for the theist, at least if she is reasonable. For she might feel strongly inclined to believe there is no God, or at least that, in some sense, she ought to believe that there is no God. No doubt, this could be a troubling state of mind, one that might properly be called a problem. But in that case calling what philosophers study under the name "the problem of evil" a problem is highly misleading. For no philosophers today take the state of mind of the cognitively dissonant theist as their object of study when they study what they refer to as "the problem of evil”.

One might think that what philosophers study under the name "the problem of evil" are arguments that should lead the theist to the cognitively dissonant state of mind just sketched, and so, by extension, such an argument is rightly called a problem for the theist. But this rationale for calling what philosophers study under the name "the problem of evil" a problem is highly contentious, to say the least. For an argument from evil should lead the theist to cognitive dissonance only if the argument is good, and there is broad disagreement over whether any argument from evil is good. Of course, those convinced that some argument from evil is not defective and that it should lead the theist to cognitive dissonance might properly call it a problem. But why should the rest of us join them?

The problem is that whereas the fool rightly was willing to grant that it is possible that the concept of a maximally excellent being be instantiated, he would have to be not just a fool but a complete schmuck to grant that it is possible that the concept of an unsurpassably great being [with additional necessary existence] be instantiated. For in granting that it is possible that there is an unsurpassably great being, he is granting that it is possible that it is necessary that there is a maximally excellent being. But if his consent to the latter is to be an informed one, he must know that the nested modal operator, “It is possibly that it is necessary,” is to be subject to the axiom of the S5 system of modal logic, according to which whatever is possibly necessary is necessary. This has the consequence that a proposition’s modal status is world-invariant. Since it is possible that the proposition that it is necessary that there is a maximally excellent being is true, this proposition is true in some possible world. But given that a necessary proposition is true in every possible world, it follow that it is true in the actual world that there is a maximally excellent being. The fool is well within his rights to charge the S5-based ontological argument with begging the question in its possibility premise.

The intelligent S5 arguer, such as Plantinga, would grant that the argument does not succeed as a piece of natural theology, but then would point out that it nevertheless serves the purpose of showing that it is not irrational or epistemically impermissible to believe that God exists; for the argument is valid and has premises, including the possibility one, that are just as likely to be true as not.

If a stalemate of intuitions is to be overcome, the opponent of the argument must give some good argument for why its possibility premise is false. This could be done by finding some concept that intuitively seems to have more likelihood of being instantiatable than does the concept of being unsurpassably great and that is strongly incompatible with it in that if either concept is instantiated in any possible world, the other instantiated in none. The concept could be that of being an unjustified evil, meaning an evil that God does not have a morally exonerating excuse for permitting, that is, an evil that could not coexist with God. But since an unsurpassably great being, if it possibly exists, exists in every possible world, in no possible world is there an unjustified evil. But it certainly seems more likely that it is possible that there be an unjustified evil than that there be an unsurpassably great being. Even some theists seem to grant the possibility of an unjustified evil when they exercise themselves in constructing theodicies that attempt to show that the apparently unjustified evils of the world really have a justification. Thus, by souping up the concept of God in the way the S5 ontological arguer does, the foundation is laid for an ontological disproof of God, conceived of as an unsurpassably great being.

It is the final proof of God’s omnipotence that he need not exist in order to save us.

The existence of evil is the [emphasis in original] most fundamental threat to the traditional Western concept of an all-good, all-powerful God

Morally speaking, how the concept of inscrutable evil comforts those suffering monumental loss is an added mystery.

To argue that all sufferers were given their just deserts is as absurd as supposing that the millions Hitler annihilated, the millions who died as a result of Stalin’s purges, or the millions who were slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge were punished by God because of some sin they committed.

...

Another claim involved here is that the great power of God, evidenced by natural catastrophes, shocks those who are on the road to error into behaving appropriately. Yet sufferers are more prone to ask, “why me?” or to question the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God than they are to revere such a destructive power. A mass miracle now and then such as ending the slaughter in the Sudan, or turning the land mines of Cambodia into flowers, would better inspire awe and reverence than the devastation wreaked by earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, volcanic eruptions, and pandemics.

When people have tried to read into ‘God can do everything’ a signification not of Pious Intention but of Philosophical truth, they have only landed themselves in intractable problems and hopeless confusions

Perhaps it is worth saying at the outset that I do not attach very much importance to arguments from evil. At best, arguments from evil create problems for the hypothesis that there is a perfect being, that is, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. It is a controversial question whether all orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods have these properties; at the very least, there is clearly a case to be made for the contention that the monotheistic gods that are described in the scriptures of the major monotheistic religions fall far short of perfect goodness

Davies (1993) and others have contended that what it means for God to be good is different from what it means for an agent to be good. Those who think of God as Being as opposed to a being have some reason to adopt this position. A more desperate strategy is to deny the existence of evil, but it is difficult to reconcile traditional monotheism with moral scepticism. Also, in so far as we believe there to be a God worthy of worship and a fitting object of human love, the appeal to moral scepticism will carry little weight. The idea that evil is a privation of the good, a twisting of something good, may have some currency in thinking through the problem of evil, but it is difficult to see how it alone could go very far to vindicate belief in God’s goodness. Searing pain and endless suffering seem altogether real even if they are analysed as being philosophically parasitic on something valuable. The three great monotheistic traditions, with their ample insistence on the reality of evil, offer little reason to try to defuse the problem of evil by this route. Indeed, classical Judaism, Christianity and Islam are so committed to the existence of evil that a reason to reject evil would be a reason to reject these religious traditions. What would be the point of Judaic teaching about the Exodus (God liberating the people of Israel from slavery) or Christian teaching about the Incarnation (Christ revealing God as love and releasing a Divine power that will, in the end, conquer death), or the Islamic teaching of Mohammed (the holy prophet of Allah who is all-just and all-merciful) if slavery, hate, death and injustice do not exist?

Theistic responses to the problem of evil distinguish between a defence and a theodicy. A defence seeks to establish that rational belief that God exists is still possible (when the defence is employed against the logical version of the problem of evil) and that the existence of evil does not make it improbable that God exists (when used against the probabilistic version). According to the defence response, no creature should expect to be able to solve the problem of evil; it is beyond our epistemic capacities to stand in judgement here. Some have adopted the defence strategy while arguing that we are in a position to have rational beliefs in the existence of evil and in a completely good God who hates this evil, even though we are unable to see how these two beliefs are compatible. A theodicy is more ambitious, and is typically part of a broader project, arguing that it is reasonable to believe that God exists in light of the good as well as the evident evil of the cosmos. In a theodicy, the project is not to account for each and every evil, but to provide an overarching framework within which to understand at least roughly how the evil that occurs is part of some overall good

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments.

תרמב

איך האב אפגעליינט דעם ארטיקל, זייער שיין געשריבן און באטעמ’ט אראפגעלייגט, אבער איך האב נישט פארשטאנען די גאנצע יסוד פונעם ארטיקל, פארוואס זאל זיך א מענטש טרייסטן אויף א טראגעדיע אז דו זאגסט אים אז די אייבירשטער האט עס אויך נישט געקענט צוריקהאלטן, איך וואלט פארשטאנען אז מ’זאגט פאר איינעם אז די אייבירשטער האט זיכער געהאט א חשבון פארוואס ער האט אוועקגענומען דיין באליבטן, נאר דו פארשטייסט נישט אלעס קען מען זיך טרייסטן אז אלעס וואס קומט פון אייבירשטן איז גוט במילא איז די צרה אויך א גוטע זאך נאר יעצט זעה איך נישט די גוטסקייט, משא’’כ דו זאגסט איינעם אז ס’איז געעווען מן הנמנע אז דיין טאטע זאל שטארבן ווייל ער האט גערייכערט, דעמאלטס עסט מען זיך אויף פארוואס האב איך אים נישט צוריקגעהאלטן, וכדומה, די בעסטע תירוץ וואס די געפיל קען געבן לאחר המעשה אז ס’געווען באשערט און דאס האט די אייבירשטער געוואלט.

For some, suffering is bearable if it results from the limitations of finite human beings, but it becomes terrifying and demonic if it is seen as part of the scheme of their all-powerful creator. Others would find life unbearably chaotic if they could not believe that suffering, tragedy, and death were part of God's plan for the world. Feeling that there is meaning and order in the world and that God in his wisdom decided to terminate the life of a loved one makes their tragedy bearable.

ופירוש העניין הזה הוא מן המקרים ההוים בנוהג של עולם והבאים על כל אדם, כגון שימצא טורח במעשיו לפרקים ויכאב גופו כשיאכל מאכלים שאינן הגונין לו לפי טבע שלו, וראשו כשיעמוד לשמש, ויהיו לו מן היגיעות שבאו אפילו על המלכים, שכגון אלו אין ניצל מהן אלא הרשע הגמור לגיהנם, שמקבל עולמו ושומרין אותו מן השמים לעשות לו כל רצונו בעוה״ז, שנאמר (תהלים י ה) יחילו דרכיו בכל עת. אבל שאר בני אדם כולם, בין צדיקים בין רשעים, בכלל מנהגו של עולם הם.

ואני מזהיר עוד למי שירצה להיות ממי שנאמר בו (חבקוק ב ד) וצדיק באמונתו יחיה, ואינו חפץ להמנות עם הנאמר בהם (דברים לב כ) בנים לא אמון בם, שלא ישתדל בחקירה הזאת מפי הספרים ורוב המדברים בעניין הזה, ויבין וידע כי אין הספק הזה רב מאוד בעניני בני האדם ואינו צריך ברוב הענינים המתקשים בתחלת העיון.

The problem of evil has always been a stumbling block to believers in a supremely beneficent Being, and the problem is acute when even one child is born hideously deformed or dies a horrible death. In this sense the problem is as old as the belief in God. Yet, after the Holocaust, many Jewish thinkers have found themselves psychologically incapable of accepting the traditional solutions that evil is a means to a glorious end. Some Jews, overwhelmed by such challenges, have abandoned any belief in God and, if they have wished to retain some allegiance to the ancestral faith, have embraced a secular Judaism in which whatever ancient rituals have been retained are made to serve not the God of Israel but the peoplehood of Israel. Many Jewish thinkers, on the other hand, still declare that they believe in God, though not in the God of traditional Jewish theism.

The most seemingly plausible (though hardly the most popular) of the modernist reinterpretations is to understand God as Person but as limited to some extent by the given, that is, by that over which God has no control. This idea, first advanced by John Stuart Mill in the last century, has antecedents in the thought of the fourteenth-century philosopher Levi ben Gershom, known as Gersonides, who held that God's power does not extend over the contingent precisely because it is contingent. Hence, while God knows all the choices open to an individual he does not know beforehand how that individual will, in fact, choose; otherwise such human choice would be meaningless (Millamot ha-Shem 3, 6). This way of looking at the problem undoubtedly has considerable power. It can be argued, as Gersonides does, that God as he appears in the Bible and the rabbinic literature is limited by the contingent. Yet it is hard to see how such a view fails to result in a kind of dualism - God and that which imposes the limits of the "given." If, as proponents of such views maintain, there are "dysteleological surds," what is one to make of the whole idea of a divine telos? When Isaac Husik remarks of Gersonides' view "we might almost say it is a theological monstrosity," he may be too sweeping, but similar qualifications of the doctrine of divine omnipotence do present very severe difficulties, for which, to date, no adequate solutions have been offered.

The naturalistic understanding of God, favored by some Jewish thinkers reluctant to abandon completely a concept of such significance, conceives of God not as a supernatural Person but rather as the power in the universe that makes for salvation. That is to say, the universe is so constituted that righteousness will eventually win out. What is required is not to jettison the God-idea but to read new meaning into the concept - in Mordecai Kaplan's words, to pour new wine into the old bottles. In reality, many of the Jewish "Death of God" theologians claim, something of the kind has always been implicit in the Jewish tradition; even when our ancestors addressed God as a person and worshiped him as such, their subconscious motivation was to draw on the impersonal force that their experience and that of their people had convinced them was at work and could be drawn upon for the spiritual enrichment of their lives. If God is thought of in this way, the mechanistic picture, supposedly demanded by science, can be accepted in its totality: nature operating by its own laws without any need for intervention by a supernatural power. The problem of evil is no problem for believers in a naturalistic God, since for them the old dilemma - either God can prevent evil and does not choose to do so or he wishes to prevent evil but cannot do so - is meaningless. A God who can choose or wish simply does not exist.

The new scientific picture does require a fresh understanding of divine providence. Many events hitherto seen as evidence of direct, miraculous, divine intervention can now be explained adequately in purely naturalistic terms. They can even be accurately forecast. It is now essential to reexamine such elements of traditional faith as miracles and petitionary prayer. But none of this is cause for absolute rejection of supernaturalism. It does not follow at all from investigation into the natural order that there is no beyond, no Being by whose fiat that order came into existence and by whose power it continues. The new methods are themselves the product of creative thinking, impossible to explain unless there is Mind in and beyond the universe.

The language of mystical or panentheistic abstraction is attractive in a number of ways. It allows one to view religious awareness as an added or deepened perception of the world, one that complements rather than contradicts ordinary and profane perception. It seems to be nurtured by an openness to a more profound rung of human consciousness, rather than calling for the "leap of faith" requisite for theism. The theology that would emerge from such a reappropriated Hasidism could be characterized as belonging to religious "naturalism" in that it entails no literal belief in a deity that is willful or active in human affairs. On the other hand, this is a naturalism deeply tempered by a sense of the supernatural, an openness to the profundities of inner experience, and a humility about the limits of human knowledge.

As the movement developed, the motif of descent and ascent was used in a more extended metaphoric way. Just as night precedes day in the order of creation, or as the long night of exile precedes the dawn of Israel's redemption, so do times of darkness alternate with those of light in the life of each individual, "for light is greater when it proceeds from the dark." Each person must go through periods of inner darkness (depression, doubt, temptation) in order to increase the light that emerges in the triumph over them. This is the closest Hasidism comes to offering a theodicy: the task of transforming suffering and evil into "light" - the joy of God's service - is left in human hands. The more profound the sufferings given to an individual, the higher the sparks that lie within that person's grasp to redeem, if the strength can but be found to effect that transformation. Ultimately there is nothing in the universe so irremediably evil, since all comes from God, that it cannot be recovered for the holy.

Creation is in fact a fault, man's famous sin thereby appearing as a minor version of a much graver one. What are we guilty of, except of having followed, more or less slavishly, the Creator's example? Easy to recognize in ourselves the fatality which was His: not for nothing have we issued from the hands of a wicked and woebegone god, a god accursed.

It is difficult, it is impossible to believe that the Good Lord — "Our Father" — had a hand in the scandal of creation. Everything suggests that He took no part in it, that it proceeds from a god without scruples, a feculent god. Goodness does not create, lacking imagination; it takes imagination to put together a world, however botched. At the very least, there must be a mixture of good and evil in order to produce an action or a work.

I ask myself: Why is it that only some people suffer? Why are only some selected from the ranks of normal people and put on the torture rack? Some religions maintain that God is trying us through suffering, or that we expiate evil and unbelief through it. If such an explanation can satisfy the religious man, it is not sufficient for anyone who notices that suffering is arbitrary and unjust, because the innocent often suffer most. There is no valid justification for suffering. Suffering has no hierarchy of values

maybe suffering has no more justification than life

וכאמונה שהוא ית' ישמע צעקת העשוק או המאונה מיד "והיה כי יצעק אלי ושמעתיו כי חנון אני".

Human existence confronts this interpretation of God's mercy and raises an important question. God does not always act mercifully. He does not always adhere to covenantal justice, nor does he always exercise merciful forgiveness. Sometimes he does not act out of mercy rooted even beyond justice. Logically and experientially these appeals contradict reality. One cannot logically assert both God's unbounded love for creation and his non-covenantal disregard of it. One cannot logically assert both God's judgment grounded upon revelation and his apparent indifference to it. Experientially, one becomes aware of God's grace and feels that one can rely upon it. One experiences God's providence and is reassured that his power is circumscribed by it. God is the Jewish people's rock, their fortress, their refuge, notwithstanding he acts in ways that deny this supposition.

At no time in Jewish existence has this problem been more forcefully in Jewish consciousness than in the aftermath of the Holocaust. The reality of that event both sears and oppresses faith. For in it God did not grant covenantal justice, nor did he show merciful forgiveness to the sinners and the sinless. Nor was he propitiated by mercy or pacified by pleading. "Yet You have rejected and disgraced us;... You make us retreat before our foe; and our enemies plunder us at will. You let them devour us like sheep; You disperse us among the nations. You sell Your people for no fortune... It is for Your sake that we are slain all day long, that we are regarded as sheep to be slaughtered" (Ps. 44: 10-23

How can the Jew hold within him the tension between God's mercy and the reality of human existence? The answer of the tradition is complex. It should be noted first that protest is a part of the tradition. The Jew does not shrink from stating the injustice of God's acts. He does not refrain from putting forth his case under the covenant. "All this has come upon us, yet we have not forgotten You, or been false to Your covenant. Our hearts have not gone astray, nor have our feet swerved from Your path, though You cast us, crushed, to where the sea monster is, and covered us over with deepest darkness. If we forgot the name of our God and spread forth our hands to a foreign god, God would surely search it out, for He knows the secrets of the heart" (Ps. 44:18-22

שאמנם ימצא העולם בזה התואר ממציאות הטוב והרע בעבור מציאות הטוב בכל המציאות בכללו, והרע אינו מכוון כוונה ראשונה אבל אמנם יתחדש במקרה, כמו העונש או המוסר המגיע מן האב אל הבן, כי הוא רע מגיע בעבור הטוב לא על הכוונה הראשונה.

וזה כי אחר שהיו במציאות טובות אי אפשר שימצאו מבלתי שימצא בהם רע מעט מעורב, כמציאות האדם אשר הוא מורכב מנפש מדברת ונפש בהמית שהם יצר טוב ויצר הרע, והושם בו היצר טוב להשארות האיש במה שאפשר, שזהו השארות הנפש, והיצר הרע הושם להשארות המין אשר אי אפשר שימצא האדם זולתו, גזרה החכמה העליונה שראוי שימצא הטוב הרב ואף אם יעורב בו רע מעט, כי הדעת נותנת שמציאות הטוב הרב עם הרע המועט יותר נבחר מהעדר הטוב הרב בעבור הרע המועט.

ולזה לא יתחייב ממציאות הטוב והרע שיהיו מהתחלות מתחלפות, כי כבר ימצא מהתחלה אחת הטוב מצד עצמו והרע במקרה, כמו האש שימשך ממנו הטוב לכל המציאות השפל בהוית ההויות כולן, וכבר יגיע ממנו הרע לפעמים שתשרוף בגד האיש החסיד במקרה.

וכן יש דברים שאף על פי שהן רעות בעצמן יונחו בעבור הטוב שאפשר שימשך מהן, כמו העונשים אשר יניחום מניחי הנימוסים הטובים, כי אף על פי שהם רעות בעצמן הונחו בעבור הטוב הכולל הנמשך לכלל האומה או המדינה, כדי שיתישרו האנשים אל מול ההצלחה ויתאחדו קצתם בקצת התאחדות גמורה, וישלם הקבוץ המדיני במיני האנשים המתחלפים, כגוף האחד שימצאו בו אברים מתחלפים ובעלי ראשיות מתחלפות ואיכיות הפכיים קצתם לקצת, וכולם לתכלית אחת והוא קיום הגוף והתאחדותו, וימצאו בו דברים מזיקים לגוף מפני הכרח החומר אי אפשר זולתם.

Spinoza's attack on the credibility of the biblical Hebrews is entirely persuasive only to those who share his belief that natural law is inviolable. Believers in the possibility of miracles, on the other hand, will not follow Spinoza's rejection of the testimony of the ancient Israelites simply because they were so credulous as to believe they had witnessed miracles. Nevertheless, Spinoza's critique reminds even the orthodox that their confidence in the literal truth of the biblical narrative ultimately rests on faith alone

This faith is not dead. However, it is, for the most part, absent from the hearts of the leading representatives of modern Jewish thought. They have followed not Maimonides but Spinoza, and have abandoned the idea of a God who has the power to contravene nature. As a result, they have also accepted the validity of Spinoza's attempt to distinguish between the opinions of the ancient Israelites and the events they actually observed. But that is where the similarity ends. They do not share Spinoza's scorn for the Israelites' unsophisticated response to their experiences. In general, they agree with Mordecai Kaplan that "the mere fact that we cannot accept as historical the record of miraculous events in the Bible and elsewhere does not imply that we regard the miracle stories as of no significance in our thinking about God and human life." They differ, however, in their analysis of the religious significance of the miracle stories

Kaplan believes that we need the tradition affirming miracles in order
to realize that we have come upon our present idea of God after considerable groping and searching for the truth. That tradition records the gropings and searchings which went on in the consciousness of our ancestors. Would we want to forget our own childish notions? Are they not essential to our experiencing our personal identity? Likewise, our tradition is indispensable as a means to our experiencing our continuity with our ancestry and our Jewish people. If we study that tradition carefully, we are bound to discover nuances and anticipations of attitudes toward life that are not only tenable but well worth cultivating

והנה הראיה ברורה להשארת הנפש הוא במות ילדים אשר אין בהם כל מום וחטא [וכבר הבאתי הוכחת הרס״ג להשארת הנפש ועוה״ב בזה], והלא הקב״ה ית״ש לא יעשה דבר לבטלה ומה הועילו הילדים האלו בעוה״ז שבין לילה היו ובין לילה מתו. האמנם אותם שזכו לענות איהש״ר ותשב״ר זכו אבותם ושמא לכך באו. אך קטנים שלא הגיעו לכלל שנים לענות איהש״ר וכדומה כאשר מתו בעווה״ר פה בקהלתינו איזה קטנים כאלו בתוך ימים מועטים א״כ קשה לאיזה תועלת נבראו? ומ״מ בזכרים אפשר שזכה האב במצות מילה שלהם, אך בנקיבות קשה.

והנה אמרו בספרים קדמונים שכל כיוצא בזה הוא גילגול אדם אחד שנגזר על הנשמה ההוא צער גילגול על כך וכך ימים ובאו לעולם וקבלה הנשמה עונשה והלכה לה. ואכתי צריכים לחקור מה חטא האב הלזה שנתן לו הקב״ה בן כזה שעתיד לצאת מן העולם במעט זמן ולא יזכה בו לשום דבר ולא יהיה לו בו אלא הצער והאבילות? ועל זה החקירה אחז״ל (שבת קה:) מפני מה בניו ובנותיו של אדם מתים כשהם קטנים דייקא דאילו היו קצת גדולים היינו אומרים שזכה בהם האב אבל להיותם קטנים וגם ״בנותיו״ דייקא שאפילו מצות מילה לא זכה על ידה, ואמר ״של אדם״ פירוש כי אין החקירה עליהם כי אולי היה נשמה שהיה צריכה להתגלגל, אך החקירה על האב מדוע אירע לו כזה? ובאה התשובה על שלא בכה והתאבל על אדם כשר וע״כ לא האמין בהשארת הנפש, ועתה ממיתת הבנים האלה ישכיל ויבין כי יש השארה לנפש כי ע״כ באו אלה לעולם וכנ״ל.

והכלל כי בהיות ישראל שלמים והם רבים לא יתנהג ענינם בטבע כלל לא בגופם ולא בארצם לא בכללם ולא ביחיד מהם כי יברך השם לחמם ומימם ויסיר מחלה מקרבם עד שלא יצטרכו לרופא ולהשתמר בדרך מדרכי הרפואות כלל כמו שאמר (שמות טו כו) כי אני ה' רופאך. וכן היו הצדיקים עושים בזמן הנבואה גם כי יקרם עון שיחלו לא ידרשו ברופאים רק בנביאים כענין חזקיהו בחלותו (מלכים ב כ ב-ג) ואמר הכתוב (ד"ה ב טז יב) גם בחליו לא דרש את ה' כי ברופאים, ואילו היה דבר הרופאים נהוג בהם מה טעם שיזכיר הרופאים? אין האשם רק בעבור שלא דרש השם אבל הוא כאשר יאמר אדם לא אכל פלוני מצה בחג המצות כי אם חמץ. אבל הדורש השם בנביא לא ידרוש ברופאים ומה חלק לרופאים בבית עושי רצון השם אחר שהבטיח (שמות כג כה) וברך את לחמך ואת מימיך והסירותי מחלה מקרבך, והרופאים אין מעשיהם רק על המאכל והמשקה להזהיר ממנו ולצוות עליו וכך אמרו (ברכות סד.) כל עשרין ותרתין שנין דמלך רבה רב יוסף אפילו אומנא לביתיה לא קרא, והמשל להם (במדב"ר ט ג) תרעא דלא פתיח למצותא פתיח לאסיא והוא מאמרם (ברכות ס) שאין דרכם של בני אדם ברפואות אלא שנהגו, שאילו לא היה דרכם ברפואות יחלה האדם כפי אשר יהיה עליו עונש חטאו ויתרפא ברצון ה'. אבל הם נהגו ברפואות והשם הניחם למקרי הטבעים וזו היא כונתם באמרם (שם) ורפא ירפא מכאן שנתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות, לא אמרו שנתנה רשות לחולה להתרפאות אלא כיון שחלה החולה ובא להתרפאות כי נהג ברפואות והוא לא היה מעדת השם שחלקם בחיים אין לרופא לאסור עצמו מרפואתו לא מפני חשש שמא ימות בידו אחרי שהוא בקי במלאכה ההיא ולא בעבור שיאמר כי השם לבדו הוא רופא כל בשר שכבר נהגו. ועל כן האנשים הנצים שהכו זה את זה באבן או באגרוף (שמות כא יח) יש על המכה תשלומי הרפואה כי התורה לא תסמוך דיניה על הנסים כאשר אמרה (דברים טו יא) כי לא יחדל אביון מקרב הארץ מדעתו שכן יהיה אבל ברצות השם דרכי איש אין לו עסק ברופאים.

מי אני

אין די לעקציע רעדט דר. דזשאָרדען פּיִטערסאן ארום איבער דאס פונאנדערטיילן צווישן ״טראגעדיע״ [והיינו סוג א׳ של הרעות מהטבע] און ״רע״ [סוג ב׳ של הרעות מהאדם אל קצתם]. ער ברענגט ארויס די געדאנק אז דאס׳ן מגדיר זיין יכולתו של הקב״ה געבט דאס אליין צו צו (ענין) ״מציאותו״ (ועיין במו״נ ח״א פנ״ו) - ווייל דאס איז א פּריִרעקוויזיט צו ״עקזיסטענץ״.

ווי אויך אז מ׳האט אויבן ארומגערעדט איבער שיטת הרמב״ם בענין דמעשה של חטא עץ הדעת משל הוא, איז אינטרעסאנט ווי ער טייטשט די מעשה אלס דעם מענטשנ׳ס עוואלוציע צו סעלף-קאנשעסנעס [סענטשיענס] וואס דאס קומט אפיר דורך די נקיבה, וואס איר אקצעפּטענס אדער רעדזשעקשאן פונעם זכר, איז וואס מאכט אויס ממבט עוואלוציע צי זיינע דזשינס גייען פּראַפּאָגעיטן. נאכ׳ן צוקומען צו סעלף-קאנשעסנעס איז דערנאך און דערפאר ארויסגעוואקסן קולטור [ציוויליזאציע].

***

אין דעם שמועס, און אז מ׳האט דערמאנט שיטת הרמב״ן, איז באקאנט וואס ער זאגט אין פ׳ בחוקתי (ויקרא כו יא) אז די געדאנק איז אז עס איז א נס אז די ברכות זאלן זיין להכלל כולו (ועיין באשכול זו). משא״כ פאר א יחיד עס זאל זיין אזוי איז פונקט אזוי שייך ביים רשע מחמת המקרים. דערנאך (ווי באקאנט) זאגט ער:

והכלל כי בהיות ישראל שלמים והם רבים לא יתנהג ענינם בטבע כלל לא בגופם ולא בארצם לא בכללם ולא ביחיד מהם כי יברך השם לחמם ומימם ויסיר מחלה מקרבם עד שלא יצטרכו לרופא ולהשתמר בדרך מדרכי הרפואות כלל כמו שאמר (שמות טו כו) כי אני ה' רופאך. וכן היו הצדיקים עושים בזמן הנבואה גם כי יקרם עון שיחלו לא ידרשו ברופאים רק בנביאים כענין חזקיהו בחלותו (מלכים ב כ ב-ג) ואמר הכתוב (ד"ה ב טז יב) גם בחליו לא דרש את ה' כי ברופאים, ואילו היה דבר הרופאים נהוג בהם מה טעם שיזכיר הרופאים? אין האשם רק בעבור שלא דרש השם אבל הוא כאשר יאמר אדם לא אכל פלוני מצה בחג המצות כי אם חמץ. אבל הדורש השם בנביא לא ידרוש ברופאים ומה חלק לרופאים בבית עושי רצון השם אחר שהבטיח (שמות כג כה) וברך את לחמך ואת מימיך והסירותי מחלה מקרבך, והרופאים אין מעשיהם רק על המאכל והמשקה להזהיר ממנו ולצוות עליו וכך אמרו (ברכות סד.) כל עשרין ותרתין שנין דמלך רבה רב יוסף אפילו אומנא לביתיה לא קרא, והמשל להם (במדב"ר ט ג) תרעא דלא פתיח למצותא פתיח לאסיא והוא מאמרם (ברכות ס) שאין דרכם של בני אדם ברפואות אלא שנהגו, שאילו לא היה דרכם ברפואות יחלה האדם כפי אשר יהיה עליו עונש חטאו ויתרפא ברצון ה'. אבל הם נהגו ברפואות והשם הניחם למקרי הטבעים וזו היא כונתם באמרם (שם) ורפא ירפא מכאן שנתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות, לא אמרו שנתנה רשות לחולה להתרפאות אלא כיון שחלה החולה ובא להתרפאות כי נהג ברפואות והוא לא היה מעדת השם שחלקם בחיים אין לרופא לאסור עצמו מרפואתו לא מפני חשש שמא ימות בידו אחרי שהוא בקי במלאכה ההיא ולא בעבור שיאמר כי השם לבדו הוא רופא כל בשר שכבר נהגו. ועל כן האנשים הנצים שהכו זה את זה באבן או באגרוף (שמות כא יח) יש על המכה תשלומי הרפואה כי התורה לא תסמוך דיניה על הנסים כאשר אמרה (דברים טו יא) כי לא יחדל אביון מקרב הארץ מדעתו שכן יהיה אבל ברצות השם דרכי איש אין לו עסק ברופאים.

דאס איז ענליך צו וואס איך האב ארויסגעברענגט אינעם ארטיקל לגבי מהלכו של הרמב״ם בהשגחה. והיינו, אז לאחרי הכל, אפילו מ׳זאל טאקע גלייבן דערין לגמרי, איז עס אבער בעצם טעארעטיש און מ׳קען אלס זאגן אז מ׳איז באמת נישט אויף די מדריגה וממילא נתון תחת מקרי הטבע. ולכאורה ה״ה הכא במהלכו של הרמב״ן.

וכתב הרמב״ם ז״ל ונמצאו באמונת ההשגחה דעות שונות אינו ראוי לכתבם. אמנם אמונה האמתית היא שההשגחה האלקית הוא בזה העולם התחתון, ר״ל מתחת גלגל הירח, במין ומין מן הדברים אלא שזה יתחלף כי במין אישי בע״ח מדברים ישגיח בפרט לבד וזה המין לבדו הוא אשר כל עניני אישיו, וזה שישיגם בפרט מטוב או רע, נמשך אחר הדין. אבל שאר בע״ח, כ״ש הצמחים וזולתם, אינם כי אם במקרה גמור, כי אין להאמין שזאת העכביש טרפה זאת הזבוב בגזירה מאת הבורא ית׳ ורצונו ולא שזה הדג חטף ובלע זאת התולעת מעל פני המים ברצון אלקי (אישית). אלא כל אלה והדומה להם הם במקרה, שהרי כבר תמהו הנביאים ע״ה על היות ההשגחה אפילו בבני אדם כי הוא קטן ופחות שישגיח הבורא ית׳ עליו כאמרם מה אנוש כי תזכרנו מה אדם ותדעהו כ״ש בזולתו מבע״ח ואף כי בצמחים. ואולם ההשגחה האלקית הוא נמשך אחר השפע האלקי, והמין אשר בו נדבק שפע ההוא עד ששב בעל שכל ונגלה לו כל שהוא גלוי לבעל שכל הוא אשר התחברה עליו השגחה האלקית וישער לו כל פעולותיו על צד הגמול והעונש כפי הדין. עוד אמר כי הואיל וההשגחה נמשכת אחר השכל א״כ כפי מה שישיג האיש ממיני האדם אל השכל כן תשיגהו ההשגחה, כי איזה איש מאישי בני אדם שהשיג מן השפע ההוא חלק יותר גדול כפי הכנת החומר שלו וכפי התלמדו תהיה ההשגחה עליו בהכרח, ולכך נאמר בהשגחה על החשובים החסידים ועזיבת הסכלים רגלי חסידיו ישמור ורשעים בחשך ידמו כי לא בכח יגבר איש ר״ל כי כשינצלו קצת ב״א מן המכות והמקרים ונפלו קצת בהם אינו לפי כחתם הגופיים והכנותיהם הטבעיות והוא אמרו כי לא בכח יגבר איש, אבל הוא לפי השלמות והחסרון ר״ל קרבם אל הבורא ית׳ או רחקם ממנו ומפני זה הקרובים אליו הם בתכלית השמירה והוא אמרו רגלי חסידיו ישמור והרחוקים ממנו מוכנים למה שיקרה שימצאם ואין שם מי שישמרם ממה שיתחדש כהולך בחושך ואין ספק שיכשל, ונאמר בהשגחה על החסידים ג״כ לא יגרע מצדיק עינו וכתיב שומר כל עצמותיו אחת מהנה לא נשברה והפסוקים אשר באו בענין הזה רבים ר״ל בהשגחה על בני אדם כפי שיעור שלימותם וחסידותם.

וכתב הפילוסוף מי שיש להם יכולת להעתיק נפשותיהם ממדה למדה הם אשר תהיה השגחת הבורא ית׳ עליהם יותר כי אע״פ שהבורא ית׳ ברא הרשעים והמציאם כדרך שהמציא הצדיקים אינו שומרם כשמרו הצדיקים כי כאשר רחקו הרשעים ממנו ית׳ כן הרחיק שמירתו מהם ומידם היתה זאת להם ולא מצד שיש למעלה שום שינוי חלילה. וכל מקום שאתה מוצא שהבורא ית׳ מאבד הרשעים ומשמידם וכיוצא בו מרעות שיעשה להם זהו ענינם ר״ל הסתלק השגחתו מעליהם לבחירתם הרעה, אמנם הבורא ית׳ לא יעניש אלא המחוייב והראוי להענש ואל זה הדעת נמשכו דברי המון חכמינו ז״ל באמרם אין מיתה בלא חטא ואין יסורין בלא עון וכן אמר הכתוב אשר עיניך פקוחות על כל דרכי ב״א לתת לאיש כדרכיו וכפרי מעלליו. אמנם שאר בע״ח זולתי האדם הענין בהם מקרה כמו שנתבאר ומפני זה היתה שחיטתם מותרת לנו וגם מצוה בה ומותר להשתמש בם לתועלתינו בכל אשר נרצה, והראיה על היותם בלתי השגחת אישית כמו שביארתי היא מאמר הנביא כשראה מהתגברות נבוכדנצר ורוב הרגו בב״א שאמר ותעשה אדם כדגי הים כרמש לא מושל בו כלומר כאילו נעזבו ב״א ונשכחו ונעשו הפקר כדגים ותולעי הארץ. ואח״כ ביאר שאין הענין כן ולא על העזיבה והשכחה והעלות ההשגחה אבל צד העונש בהם להתחייבם מה שחל בהם והוא אומרו ה׳ למשפט שמתו וצור להוכיח יסדתו.

It would appear that the lack of reference to nature in the Bible is a necessary corollary of God's omnipotence - a position that the Bible assumed and emphatically developed. Thus, the absence of independent laws of nature and the emphasis on divine creation and control of everything that exists and occurs highlight the position that everything in our world is subject to the absolute authority of God and is responsive to his will

This halakhah contains one of the most difficult passages in The Ways of Repentance. Logic would dictate, and even a cursory familiarity with Judaism teaches, that children cannot be held responsible for their parents’ behavior. How is it that Maimonides explicitly placed the responsibility for the well-being of a child on the behavior of the parent? The very same verse quoted here begins with the phrase, parents will not die because of their children, and children will not die because of their parents. Elsewhere, however, the Torah states (Exodus 34:7) that God visits the iniquity of the parents on the children, a concept that supports the statement of Maimonides here. How can these statements be resolved?

Rabbi Eliyahu Touger cites other Talmudic passages that limit the extent of this alarming idea. It is written in tractate Sanhedrin (27b) that a child may not be punished for a parent’s transgressions unless the child also commits that same transgression. This is the meaning of the verse in Deuteronomy that says children will not die because of their parents, which refers to children who are now adults. Indeed, a child who labors under challenges of a difficult parental history may be held to a higher, more demanding standard of behavior if that child, now an adult, fails to learn the harmful nature of their parents’ example.

Minor children, on the other hand, do not necessarily enjoy special protection from the consequences of their parents’ behavior. Harsh as it may seem, sometimes parents receive retribution through their children, one of the most horrible punishments imaginable. A biblical example of this is recorded in the book of Samuel II 11-13, where no less a figure than King David is held accountable for his problematic relationship with Bathsheba, and his punished fourfold through his children: the death of the unnamed infant child that Bathsheba bore from their encounter, the rape of his daughter Tamar by David’s son Amnon, the revenge killing of Amnon by David’s son Absalom, and the rebellion of Absalom and his ultimate death at the hands of David’s soldiers.

Theologically, this concept remains deeply disturbing. Further exploration of the idea, however, is beyond the scope of this work, and falls within the category of tsadik ve-ra lo: “why do the righteous suffer,” the most difficult question in all of Judaism (see 3.2). The inscrutability of God, described in a more academic and distant manner in the previous chapter, is far more difficult to assimilate when it is expressed in the suffering of a child.

The central thrust of this halakhah, however, is clear. After reiterating the validity of human freedom of choice, Maimonides affirms that we are held accountable for our harmful actions. Punishment for those negative choices is meted out in this world and in the next.

תניא רבי חנניא בנו של רבן גמליאל אומר מפני מה גרים בזמן הזה מעונין ויסורין באין עליהן מפני שלא קיימו שבע מצות בני נח רבי יוסי אומר גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי אלא מפני מה מעונין לפי שאין בקיאין בדקדוקי מצות כישראל

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נאכן דורכליינען דיינע מאמרים בעיון רב, קומט נאכאמאל צום אויבערפלאך אז טעאדיסי - ווי מער מען וויל דאס מסביר זיין אלס שווערער ווערט דאס ענין. עס איז בבחינת חידה סתימה יש באדם מרעיבו שבע ומשביעו רעב. אז מ’לעבט ווייט פון די קשיא קען מען האבן א שטיקל שלוה, ווי מער דו גראבסט אריין אלס טיפער פאלסטו אריין.

די קשיא למה פרעניות באין לאדם, איז אזוי אלט ווי דער מענטש, מיר קוקט דאס די אלע ענטפערס ווי שיינע אישביצער תורות וואס בארואיגט דעם מענטש בשעת’ן ליינען, אבער די רגע מען מאכט צו דעם ספר, הדרא קושיא לדוכתא. עס איז באקאנט וואס דער תניא זאגט אז א סברה קען נישט אריינגיין אין א כלי, דאס קען נישט ווערן מוסבר ומיושב.

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ווי אנדערע האבן אנגעמערקט זע איך נישט ווי די תורות קען העלפן א מענטש בעת צרה, אפילו עס זאל געשען מחמת מאורעות הטבע, אויב זאגסטו אז ג-ט האט דיך נישט געקענט העלפן ווערט די מענטש מער צובראכן. די בעסטער ענטפער איז אז ער וואלט דיך געקענט יא זאגן די סיבה, און אויב דו וואלסט געוויסט די סיבה וואלסטו נישט מיט געשפירט דיין חבר'ס צרה, אזוי ווי די באקאנטער ווארט אז משה רבינו האט דוקא נישט געוואלט וויסן די סיבות הצרות פון כלל ישראל כדי מיט צו שפירן מיט די צרות ישראל. סא דער מענטש איז אין די בעסטער פאזיציע ווען ער איז די ווייטסטע פונעם תירוץ. ווי מער די ראציאנאליזירסט עס אלס שווערער ווערט דאס. ווי מער וידם אהרן עס איז אלס מער אבסראקט, באהאלטן, פריוואט, איז עס.

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ווי א קינד וואס לערנט א”ב האב איך אפגעלערנט דעם רלב”ג וואס דו האסט באריכות ציטירט אז ידיעת ה’ איז נישט מגיע אל הפרטים, און דאס מיינט אז ידיעתו ית’ איז בתכלית השלימות בנוגע די כללים, געזעצן, און מעגליכע פרטים, אבער די ידיעה גייט נישט אריין אין די פרטים פינקטליך פון וואס ער טוט. אבער איך קוק דאס אן ממש ווי אריינלייגן א סברה אין א כלי, איך זע נישט וויאזוי די סברה קען אנרירן דעם חומר אפילו, וואו גייט כאפן א נפק”מ אויב הקב”ה ווייסט די עקרי הכללים און נישט די פרטים. גייט עס כאפן אז עס איז דא א מילדערע השגחה אין פינקטליכע פרטים? מיינט דאס אז דער מענטש איז באותו זמן כאילו נעזב למקרים, א פארלוירענע שעפסל אויסגעשטעלט צו די רחמנות פון די לייבן?

איך זיך נישט דא צו פריטשען צו די קווייער, אבער די סברא איז ממש א פסיק רישא. ווי איז דא א מעגליכקייט נישט צו זיין אונטער זיין השגחה?

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מיר ווייסן דאך אז באמת איז נישטא קיין חילוק פון טבע ושלא כטבע, נאר דאס איז לשבר את האוזן. אויב גייסטו מיטן יש בעל לבירה האט ער פולע קאנטראל. קאנטראל מיינט ידיעה והשגחה על כל הפרט. נישט קיין חילוק וויאזוי דו דייסט עס בלייבט עס אונטער א ידיעה ברירה בפרטיים ממש.

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דו ברענגסט נאך אז עונש קען מיינען אז ער ווערט נעזב למקרים און נישט הקב”ה גייט ברענגן עליהם רעה. נאכאמאל, וואו כאפט דאס א נפק”מ? ווער קאנטראלירט די מקרים? איז דא א פאל אז די טבע והמקרא זאלן מאכן שבת פאר זיך אן א פונקטליכע פראגראמירטע מאפע וויאזוי עס זאל פארן?

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למאי נפקא מיניה אויב עס איז יש מאין הגמור, אדער פון א חומר קדמון וואס האט אלץ עקזסטירט? האט הקב”ה ווייניגער עקסעס צו א חומר קדמון? איז ער מער באגרעניצט? אויב וועסטו זאגן אז ער האט געמאכט געזעצן און ער אליין מוז פאלגן די געזעצן, איז דען נישט מעגליך פאר אים צו מאכן א מציאות וואס פארלעצט נישט דעם געזעץ?

פרייוויליג

מיין עיקר קשיא איז, אז אויב עפענסטו אויף איין פיצעלע מחט אז ג-ט איז כביכול באגרעניצט צו א געוויסע שטח דאמאלט וואו גייסטו זיך אפשטעלן? אפשר איז ער מער באגרעניצט וואו דו מיינסט?

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איך וועל מסיים זיין מיטן רמב"ם במס' סנהדרין פרק חלק: נחלקו בה ר"ע ור"א אי עשרת השבטים עתידין לחזור לעתיד, וכתב הרמב"ם בפירוש המשנה: כבר הזכרנו לך כמה פעים שכל מחלוקת שתהיה בין החכמים ואינה תלויה במעשה אלע קביעת סברה בלבד אין מקום לפסוק הלכה כאחד מהם.

די אלע שמועסן, מחלוקות הראשונים זענען סברות, געדאנקן, תורות, ואין מקום לפסוק הלכה כאחד מהם.

ואף שבתחלה קצור קצרה ידי מלכתוב ומלדרוש ברבים דברים של גילגול בראותי דברי הראב״מ ז״ל המונע בענין, אמנם אחרי ראותי דברי עמק המלך שהביא משם מהר״י אברבנאל זצ״ל שדברים של גילגול מותר לדורשם ברבים היפך סברת אחרים, משום שענין הגילגול אינו ענין להעלימו כדברי רזי התורה וסודותיה שהם דברים נסתרים, משום שאם ענין הגילגול הוא מסודי רזי התורה איך גילה אותה הקב״ה לפיטגוראש שהיה גוי ע״כ. ובראותי הדברים האלה מתוקים מדבש, ואני המחבר אומר שהוא מצוה להודיע ענין הגילגול לרבים ולהשקיע הדברים בראשם אשר עם ענין הגילגול מתישבים קושיות עצומות אשר גורמים לאדם לסור מאחרי ה׳ כצדיק ורע לו וכדומה ועם הגילגול מתישבים כמו שעיניך החכם רואה הענינים.

The theological issues discussed in sermons of a particular period reveal the beliefs that were especially important and problematic at that time. An example is the doctrine of divine providence, including God's knowledge of particular occurrences on earth. This was a standard problem of philosophical theology, pitting a pure Aristotelian theology against the biblical and rabbinic tradition. When preachers spoke to Jewish congregations in the wake of historical upheavals, the problem was much more immediate: Jews wanted to know whether God was responsible for, or even aware of, what had happened. The frequent recurrence of sermons insisting on God's knowledge of particulars and providential concern for the Jews shows a persistent psychological need to affirm God's intimate connection with Jewish suffering

It is contended, moreover, that there can be no Jewish theology in this most terrible of centuries unless it is prepared to ask: What do we know now about the creator God in whose universe such horror is permitted? It may well be the case that the appropriate reply of classical traditionalists is that nothing can be asked about God's nature, that he keeps the mystery to himself, that we are obliged only to persevere in serving him. To this the reply has been made: Why continue then to serve such a God? If the traditional God is he who cares and is merciful, so much for the value of his scriptural promises. If it is said that all who perished - stressing the children, as Emil Fackenheim has done - were sinners, so much for the divine understanding of sin. And if, as is also done by some religious Zionists who enjoy hearing the rustle of the messianic wind in the establishment of a jewish state, the birth of Israel is to be credited to divine redemption, must not the Holocaust be ascribed as well to God - and, it might be added, is even that excellent, but beleaguered, state worth six million Jewish lives?

All of the foregoing perplexities are intended to illustrate the difficulty of standing with the classical agenda of Jewish theology: a God of absolute authority and perfect understanding, all-powerful and cognizant, creator, revealer, redeemer according to his own will and council, lawgiver and instructor to a nation of imperfect creatures, offering free will but reserving the privilege of intervention, using history to correct, and instruct by both action and passivity

Eventually, though, I felt compelled to leave Christianity altogether. I did not go easily. On the contrary, I left kicking and screaming, wanting desperately to hold on to the faith I had known since childhood and had come to know intimately from my teen-aged years onward. But I came to a point where I could no longer believe. It’s a very long story, but the short version is this: I realized that I could no longer reconcile the claims of faith with the facts of life. In particular, I could no longer explain how there can be a good and all-powerful God actively involved with this world, given the state of things. For many people who inhabit this planet, life is a cesspool of misery and suffering. I came to a point where I simply could not believe that there is a good and kindly disposed Ruler who is in charge of it.

The problem of suffering became for me the problem of faith. After many years of grappling with the problem, trying to explain it, thinking through the explanations that others have offered — some of them pat answers charming for their simplicity, others highly sophisticated and nuanced reflections of serious philosophers and theologians — after thinking about the alleged answers and continuing to wrestle with the problem, about nine or ten years ago I finally admitted defeat, came to realize that I could no longer believe in the God of my tradition, and acknowledged that I was an agnostic: I don’t “know” if there is a God; but I think that if there is one, he certainly isn’t the one proclaimed by the Judeo-Christian tradition, the one who is actively and powerfully involved in this world. And so I stopped going to church

…

Some thinkers have tried to deny one or the other of the assertions. Some, for example, have argued that God is not really all powerful — this is ultimately the answer given by Rabbi Kushner in When Bad Things Happen to Good People. For Kushner, God wishes he could intervene to bring your suffering to an end, but his hands are tied. And so he is the one who stands beside you to give you the strength you need to deal with the pain in your life, but he cannot do anything to stop the pain. For other thinkers this is to put a limit on the power of God and is, in effect, a way of saying that God is not really God.

Others have argued that God is not all loving, at least in any conventional sense. This is more or less the view of those who think God is at fault for the terrible suffering that people endure — a view that seems close to what Elie Wiesel asserts when he expresses his anger at God and declares him guilty for how he has treated his people. Others, again, object and claim that if God is not love, again he is not God.

There are some people who want to deny the third assertion; they claim that there is not really any suffering in the world. But these people are in the extreme minority and have never been very convincing to most of us, who prefer looking at the world as it is to hiding our heads in the sand like ostriches

…

Other people — including some of my brilliant friends — realize why it’s a religious problem for me but don’t see it as a problem for themselves. In its most nuanced form (and for these friends everything is extremely nuanced), this view is that religious faith is not an intellectualizing system for explaining everything. Faith is a mystery and an experience of the divine in the world, not a solution to a set of problems.

I respect this view deeply and some days I wish I shared it. But I don’t. The God that I once believed in was a God who was active in this world. He saved the Israelites from slavery; he answered prayer; he intervened on behalf of his people when they were in desperate need; he was actively involved in my life. But I can’t believe in that God anymore, because from what I now see around the world, he doesn’t intervene

ונאמר כי כשיאמר עליו יתברך שהוא טוב ראוי שיבחן זה משני צדדים שאמרנו, וזה, כי מצד פעולותיו אמנם יאמר עליו שהוא טוב מצד שכל הטובות נמשכות ממנו, ואי אפשר שימשך הטוב אלא ממי שהוא טוב, אמר הכתוב טוב ה' לכל, אבל כשיתואר מצד עצמו ראוי שיובן הענין שולליי, כי נקרא טוב לפי שעצמותו נקי מן החסרון אחר שאין בו אפשרות כמו שבארנו, ולזה לא ישיגהו שום שנוי ולא העדר, לפי שכל העדר הוא רע.

גם אמר שאין כל צדיק זוכה להינצל ממקרי המערכת גם לא מזדון הרשעים והיזקם זולתי בהיותו צדיק גמור, אבל לצדיק שאינו גמור יקרה לפעמים מצד המערכת כמו שיקרה גם לקצת רשעים. גם אמר שבסור האדם מהנהגת האור השכלי אשר בו הנה ראוי הוא שלא יהיה לו שום קיום, ושזה היה קורה ג״כ לגרמים השמימיים לולא הנהגת העצם הנבדל המניע, כ״ש שראוי שיקרה זה לעצם הנפסד כמו שיקרה למין האנושי בהרבה מבחירותיו.

It cannot be overlooked that in the divine response from the whirlwind to Job’s passionate and desperate plea for understanding why he, an innocent man, is suffering so horribly, no answer is given. God does not explain why Job suffers. He simply asserts that he is the Almighty and, as such, cannot be questioned. He does not explain that Job had committed sins of which he was simply unaware. He does not say that the suffering did not come from him but from other humans (or demonic beings) who were behaving badly toward Job. He does not indicate that it has all been a test to see if Job would remain faithful. His only answer is that he is the Almighty who cannot be questioned by mere mortals, and that the very quest for an answer, the very search for truth, the very impulse to understand is an affront to his Powerful Being. God is not to be questioned and reasons are not to be sought. Anyone who dares to challenge God will be withered on the spot, squashed into the dirt by his overpowering presence. The answer to suffering is that there is no answer, and we should not look for one. The problem with Job is that he expects God to deal rationally with him, to give him a reasonable explanation of the state of affairs; but God refuses to do so. He is, after all, God. Why should he have to answer to anybody? Who are we, mere mortals, to question GOD?

This response of God from the whirlwind seems to get God off the hook for innocent suffering — he can do whatever he pleases, since he is the Almighty and is not accountable to anyone. On the other hand, does it really get him off the hook? Doesn’t this view mean that God can maim, torment, and murder at will and not be held accountable? As human beings, we’re not allowed to get away with that. Can God? Does the fact that he’s almighty give him the right to torment innocent souls and murder children? Does might make right?

Moreover, if the point is that we cannot judge the cruel acts of God by human standards (remember: Job was innocent!), where does that leave us? In the Bible, aren’t humans made in the image of God? Aren’t human standards given by God? Doesn’t he establish what is right and fair and just? Aren’t we to be like him in how we treat others? If we don’t understand God by human standards (which he himself has given), how can we understand him at all, since we’re human? Isn’t this explanation of God’s justice, at the end of the day, simply a cop-out, a refusal to think hard about the disasters and evils in the world as having any meaning whatsoever?

. . .

Some [biblical] authors — such as the one who wrote the powerful poetic dialogues of Job — maintained that suffering is a mystery. I resonate with this view, but I do not think highly of its corollary — that we have no right to ask about the answer to the mystery, since we are, after all, mere peons and God is the ALMIGHTY, and we have no grounds for calling him to task for what he has done. If God made us (assuming the theistic view for a moment), then presumably our sense of right and wrong comes from him. If that’s the case, there is no other true sense of right and wrong but his. If he does something wrong, then he is culpable by the very standards of judgment that he has given us as sentient human beings. And murdering babies, starving masses, and allowing — or causing — genocides are wrong

Moreover, for this author [of Ecclesiastes] “traditional” wisdom was inherently flawed — another reason I like him so much. It simply is not true that the righteous are rewarded in life and the wicked perish: “In my vain life I have seen everything; there are righteous people who perish in their righteousness, and there are wicked people who prolong their life in their evil doing” (Eccles. 7:15); “there are righteous people who are treated according to the conduct of the wicked, and there are wicked people who are treated according to the conduct of the righteous. I said that this also is vanity” (Eccles. 8:14). The reason it is all hevel is that everyone dies and that’s the end of the story: “Everything that confronts them is vanity, since the same fate comes to all, to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and the unclean, to those who sacrifice and those who do not sacrifice. As are the good, so are the sinners . . . the same fate comes to everyone” (Eccles. 9:1–3). Even in this life, before death, rewards and punishments are not meted out according to merit; everything is dependent on chance.
Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the skillful; but time and chance happen to them all. For no one can anticipate the time of disaster. Like fish taken in a cruel net, and like birds caught in a snare, so mortals are snared at a time of calamity, when it suddenly falls upon them. (Eccles. 9:11–12

Other people, of course, have dealt with suffering by insisting that we change our views of God. This is what Rabbi Harold Kushner urges in his best-selling book When Bad Things Happen to Good People. I have to admit, when I first read the book, in preparation for my course on suffering in the biblical traditions at Rutgers in the mid-1980s, I didn’t like it at all and started calling it “When Bad Books Are Written by Good People.” My problem with it was that Kushner wanted to argue that God is not all powerful and cannot control the bad things that happen to people. What I found most unsettling was that Kushner took this to be the teaching of the Bible itself, specifically the book of Job. I thought that interpretation was outrageously bad, in fact just the opposite of the view of Job (and of almost all the other biblical writers). Job’s entire point is that God is the Almighty who created and runs this world, and that mere mortals have no right to question him for what he does, even when he makes the innocent suffer. Kushner had not simply gotten an interpretation wrong — he had gotten it precisely reversed

I reread Kushner a couple of months ago, and I must say that now that I’m older (and generally less irritable), I had a very different reaction to the book. It is, in fact, a wise book written by a wise man that can speak to people who are experiencing personal tragedy. I suppose that now — twenty years later — I’m not nearly as concerned as I used to be about having the “correct” interpretation of the Bible. I’ve seen a lot over the past two decades, and biblical interpretation no longer strikes me as the biggest concern on the face of the planet. Moreover, Kushner’s view has a lot to be said for it. Not that it’s a correct interpretation of Job — it’s not even close. But it is a helpful view, one that has in fact helped many thousands of people, maybe even millions

For Kushner, God is not the one who causes our personal tragedies. Nor does he even “permit” them when he could otherwise prevent them. There are simply some things that God cannot do. He can’t intervene to keep us from suffering. But what he can do is equally important. He can give us the strength to deal with our suffering when we experience it. God is a loving Father who is there for his people, not to guarantee miraculously that they never have hardship, but to give them the peace and strength they need to face the hardship

I now find this a powerful view, and it is understandable that so many people have been affected by it. If I still believed in God, it is probably the view I would eventually want to take. But for a biblical scholar like me, I have to admit that it still seems problematic. Most of the Bible’s authors are completely unequivocal about the power of God. It is not limited. God knows all things and can do all things. That’s why he is God. To say that he can’t cure cancer, or eliminate birth defects, or control hurricanes, or prevent nuclear holocaust is to say that he’s not really God — at least not the God of the Bible and of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Believing in a God who stands beside me in my suffering, but who cannot actually do much about it, makes God a lot like my mother or my kindly next-door neighbor, but it doesn’t make him a lot like GOD

according to Ibn Sīnā, there is more good than evil in the Universe. While evil occurs on earth, which is small compared to the universe, evil does not strike a whole species, but mostly individuals; not all individuals and only at certain times. Even if someone would say that evil is predominant, Ibn Sīnā reminds us that there is a difference between numerous and predominant. Evil is not predominant on this earth, but it may be widespread

rejected the idea that God was beyond good and evil; since for him, anyone is evil when he does certain types of acts or creates things which are evil in character. Thus, according to Ibn Rushd, this qualification of evil also applied to God and was therefore a problem for him which he tried to avoid in certain ways

Another passage concerns our unwarranted assumptions about man’s physical centrality in creation, that the world should be arranged for our comfort, and the sense that we have somehow been falsely wronged:
Thereby, it humbles humanity in that it allows it to see that it has no right [...] to expect from the laws of nature that God has ordered purely agreeable consequences, and it probably teaches also in this manner to see: that this playground of his desires should not contain the objective of all his [God’s] intentions. (EE2 AA 1:431

Two important points stand out here. Firstly, we can see that Kant considers that man cannot expect to avoid deleterious consequences from the workings of nature’s laws. Secondly, Kant states that man and this earth being ‘the playground of his desires’ is not the sole objective in God’s plan in creation. Neither point is new; we have seen these already made in Reflections 3703–5 where Kant recognised that both Leibniz and Pope had expressed themselves in a similar manner.

Most significantly, in the Schlußbetrachtung of the second essay Kant definitively breaks any possible link between moral and physical evil when he maintains that the latter is not a punishment for the former, stating:
One offends completely against this [our love for our fellow man in his misery], however, when one at any time regards such fate as imposed punishment that will hit the concerned cities for their evil deeds and when we view these misfortunes as the goal of the avenging God as his justice that flows over all. (EE2 AA 1:459

The passage also suggests that not only do we wrong our neighbour when we accuse him of moral evil on the evidence of the physical evil he experiences, but we also offend against God’s justice. Kant strongly reinforces this point in his treatment of Job’s troubles in the later Miscarriage. In addition to breaking the link between moral and physical evil, Kant goes further and sees that in addition to any attempt to make or maintain the link being wrong, it is presumptuous on man’s part since it depends on a claimed insight into God’s ways (cf. EE2 AA 1:459–60), a standpoint again reinforced in Miscarriage

When we look to Only Possible Argument we find Kant confirming the stance taken in this second Earthquake Essay, namely that those events which could be termed natural evil are not evil at all but just the consequences of nature’s laws. He states:
Furthermore, the occurrence of these events [destructive forces] from time to time is sufficiently grounded in the constitution of nature, according to a universal law. But the vices and moral corruption of human race are not natural grounds connected with these events, nor are they to be numbered among the laws in accordance with which they take place [...] And that attribution implies that the event in question was a misfortune, not a punishment: man’s moral conduct cannot be a cause of earthquakes according to natural law, for there is no connection here between the cause and the effect. (OPA AA 2:104

ולכן יהיו אלו השלמים יותר מדקדקים במצות הלשון והמעשה מזולתם, לא כמו שיאמרו הסכלים ההמונים שהפלוסופים אינם מתפללים הפך מה שהוא האמת, חי ה', לפי שהם, רצוני הפילוסופים יבינו שבחי התפלה שספרום רז"ל, ויבינו מה שאמר אפלטון התפלה רסן הנפש המתאוה, ומה שאמר יוסיפון על דניאל כי המתפלל עם אלהיו הוא מדבר, כל שכן שאלו לבדם יבינו מלות התפלה שלנו המסודרת מיד הפילוסופים הגדולים אנשי כנסת הגדולה , ודבריהם יוכיחו למי שיבינם ואם הם מעטים, ובכלל אומר אני כי אין מדקדק שלם במצות הלשון והמעשה כמו הפילוסופים מבני עמנו אם נמצאו, וחי ה' שלא אומר זה על צד מליצת השיר או על צד ההמשך לדת היהודים, רק יביאני לזה חפצי לומר האמת מצד מה שהוא אמת, אבל ההמון יטעה לחשבם כפילוסופים, מי שאין לו חלק כלל בפולופסופיא, וברוך היודע.

וחלילה לך בני בחירי להמשך אהר דעת חכמי דורני המדברים תועה על עבדי השם ואוהביו, ואומרים כי המשתדלים בחכמת השבעה הם מבזים דברי רבותינו ז״ל, ומשימים המצות התוריית לדבר אין בו תועלת, עד שיחשבו סכלים מעמנו כי החכמה תחייב זה ללומדיה, ובראותם אחד מן המתפלספים מתפלל, ישומו עליו ויתמהו איש אל רעהו ויאמרו הגם הפלוסופים מתפללים, על צד הגנאי בשם הפיליסוף. ולא ידעו אלה גדר הפילוסיף ולא הוראתו שהיא : אוהב חכמה. ובאמת אין הדבר כמו שחשבו אלה בענין המצות אבל נהפך הוא, כי בלי ספק לא יהיה האדם זריז במצות ותם לבב לעשותם ולקיימם כי אם זה אשר פקח השם את עיניו להביט אלה החכמות הבטת שכל, כמו שימהר העובד לעשות גדר סביב גני׳ אשר נטע בו כל פרי מגדים, ולא זה אשר ארצו שממה, ואיך יבזה המשתדל בחכמה את חכמינו אשר יסדו הגדרים, והוא אוהב תכלית אהבה הגדרים והסייגים, לכן אומר אני כי השוגה בזאת החכמה ולא התנהל בדרך זה, אמת ראה הספר, אמנם לא הבין דבר מה כתוב בו, או הבין בו כוונה משובשת, כי מבואר הדבר לכל בעל שכל, כי הלשון להרגיל והמעשה לזכור, וביחוד אמר אפלטון :התפלה רסן נפש המתאוה, לכן איך שיהיה סדר התפלה, יהיה הכוננו לפני השם כאלו עומד לפניו מטיב מחשבותיו ומיירא אותו כל היום מחטוא, כל שכן לסדר תפלתנו מיד אנשי כנסת הגדולה וזולתם מחכמינו, שסדורה טוב בלי ספק, ואמרותיה צרופות. לכן מי שישים לבו וכל עשתנותיו ותשוקותיו אל השכל ולימוד החכמות, יהיה זריז להתפלל בבוקר, כדי שתנוח דעתו ביראת ה' כל היום, וכן בערב בקומו מהעיון, פן יסיר לבבו, וכן בלילה בשכבו על מטתו, כדי שלא יהרהר על משכבו, ואולם למשכים בבוקר לשתות יין, וזולת זה מתענוגי העולם ועסקי הבליו, ולערב יתלוצץ עם חביריו, ובלילה אשתו מספרת עמו התפלה למה לו, אחר שתמיד כל רעיוניו במפורסמות.

ולעולם שאין שום אדם נענש על עון אחרים זולתי הבן הקטן בעון אביו, או כשהוא גדול ואוחז מעשה אבותיו ומרשיע בהם, וזה בכל איזה עבירה שתהיה לדעת רבים, ולדעת קצת דוקא בחטא עבודה זרה, וכן כתב הרמב"ן ז"ל בפירוש התורה.

ויש שנבראים בתחלת הבריאה חסרי אברים, ויש מתים קודם כ' שנה, ומשעה שעמדו על דעתם היו צדיקים עוסקים בתורה ובמצות ויש להם זכיות ואין להם עונש שמים, כמו שאמרו רז"ל שאין ב"ד של מעלה עונשים עד אותו הפרק.

הקטן יותר מחויב לברך ולהודות על נסו, שהגדול אע"פ שחטא יוכל להיות שהיו בידו זכיות כנגדו שעמדו לו להנצל, משא"כ בקטן שאין בידו זכיות שאין לו שכר מצוה כמצווה ועושה, אע"פ שבודאי הקב"ה אינו מקפח שכרו לעולם שכולו טוב, אבל להגין עליו מן המיתה והיסורין הנגזרים אם מפאת מזלו או מצד אבותיו או אנשי עירו החייבים ודאי שאין כח זכיותיו יפה כל כך ככח זכותו של גדול.

הרי מבורר שאין הבן נענש בעון האב זולתי כשאוחז מעשה אביו והוא רשע כמוהו, לא כשהוא צדיק. וכל זה כשהבן הוא גדול מבן י״ג שנה ולמעלה שאז יצדק לומר עליו צדיק או רשע, אבל כשהוא קטן הרי הוא כשאר ממונו של אדם ומת בעון אביו, וכבר נזכר זה בדברי רז״ל בכמה מקומות איני צריך להביאם, גם בתורה נרמז זה במ״ש (דברים כד טז) איש בחטאו ימותו ר״ל כשהוא איש יומת בחטאו אבל כשעדיין אינו איש שהוא קטן אפשר שלא ימות בחטאו אלא בחטא האב.

The trouble has come from the idea that the Absolute is a moral person. If you start from that basis, then the relation of evil to the Absolute presents at once an irreducible dilemma. The problem then becomes insoluble, but not because it is obscure or in any way mysterious. To any one who has the sense and courage to see things as they are, and is resolved not to mystify others or himself, there is really no question to discuss. The dilemma is plainly insoluble because it is based on a clear self-contradiction

the fundamental concern about evil, for Hume, was that it drove people towards the notion of a particular providence, which encouraged superstition, fanaticism and the violent passions: love, hatred, grief, joy, pride and humility. By a particular providence, Hume refers to a situation in which a deity, responding to intercessions or otherwise, intervenes in the course of this life and the next to provide for and judge his human creatures. Hume finds no evidence for this because of the imperfect state of distributive justice, the lack of justification of a future life, the existence of disasters in the world and the sheer impossibility of inferring from the mixed fortunes of the world to a beneficent divinity

If Hume is successful in his aim of showing that God is amoral then he is successful both in dissolving the problem of evil and in nullifying the notion of a particular providence. But by the same token, he violates the notion of divine simplicity

If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful or uncertain?

It is very safe for us to affirm, that whatever we know the deity to have actually done, is best; but it is very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do what to us seems best

Convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, miracles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion: the cause of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable. Madness, fury, rage, and an inflamed imagination, though they sink men nearest to the level of beasts, are for a like reason, often supposed to be the only dispositions, in which they can have any immediate communication with the Deity

Assuming that "good" and "powerful" are used in theology as they are used in ordinary discourse, we have to say that Hume was right. The charge has never been answered and never will be. The simultaneous attribution of all-power and all-goodness to the Creator of the whole world is logically incompatible with the existence of evil and pain in the world, for which reason the conception of a finite God, who is not all-powerful . . . has become popular in some quarters

a theologian who accepts the existence of God (either as an item of faith or on the basis of an a priori argument) must conclude either that there is some morally sufficient reason for God's allowing suffering in the world, or that there are no instances of suffering in the world. He will, of course, choose the first alternative. Thus, in a theology of the sort now under consideration, the theologian begins by affirming the existence of God and by acknowledging the occurrence of suffering. It follows logically that God has some morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of suffering. The conclusion is not, as [Hume’s] Philo suggests, that there might be a morally sufficient reason for evil. The conclusion is, rather, that there must be such a reason. It could not be otherwise.

What then of the traditional theological problem of evil? Within a theology of the above type, the problem of evil can
only be the problem of discovering a specific theodicy which is adequate - that is, of discovering which, if any, of the specific proposals which might be advanced really describes God's morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of suffering. This problem, of course, is not a major one for the theologian. If the problem of evil is simply the problem of uncovering the specific reason for evil - given assurance that there is (and must be) some such reason - it can hardly be counted as a critical problem. Once it is granted that there is some specific reason for evil, there is a sense in which it is no longer vital to find it. A theologian of the type we are now considering might never arrive at a satisfactory theodicy. ([Hume’s] Philo's "unknown" reason might remain forever unknown.) He might condemn as erroneous all existing theodicies and might despair of ever discovering the morally sufficient reason in question. A charge of incompleteness would be the worst that could be leveled at his world view

It ought not to go unnoticed that Philo's closing attack on Cleanthes' position has extremely limited application. Evil in the world has central negative importance for theology only when theology is approached as a quasi-scientific subject, as by Cleanthes. That it is seldom approached in this way will be evident to anyone who has studied the history of theology. Within most theological positions, the existence of God is taken as an item of faith or embraced on the basis of an a priori argument. Under these circumstances, where there is nothing to qualify as a "hypothesis" capable of having either negative or positive "evidence," the fact of evil in the world presents no special problem for theology. As Philo himself has suggested, when the existence of God is accepted prior to any rational consideration of the status of evil in the world, the traditional problem of evil reduces to a noncrucial perplexity of relatively minor importance

I suggest that the nature and content of the world are relevant to the problem of evil, and this, independently of whether this is the best possible world. This becomes evident by considering what may indeed be the case, that this world is one in which there is more evil than good. In such a world, the evil would lack a justification, whether or not the world was the best possible world. A wholly good, omnipotent God would refrain from creating a world in which evil predominated even were this the best possible world he could create. I suggest therefore that the underlying suggestion that evil is justified if this is the best of all possible worlds is mistaken

A consequential question following on from this concerns whether, if an all-perfect God must create the better (or best if there is one) world, he can be said to be free and omnipotent. Leibniz's God, it would seem, would have no real choice between the creation of alternative worlds if he can opt only for the one world (or for one from the many equally best possible worlds if there be such, which Leibniz would seem to deny). This again is a special instance of the more general problem of omnipotence and perfection, of power and goodness.

The more basic challenge to Leibniz's account takes the form of denying that the concept of the best of all possible worlds is a coherent one. Thomists such as Journet argue that the concept is incoherent, meaningless, without application. Journet writes:
The notion of the best of all possible worlds is by definition unrealizable - like that of the fastest possible speed - for 'whatever thing he has made, God could make a better one', and so on indefinitely. To demand that God, to be above reproach, must make the best of all possible worlds is to demand him to make what is not feasible, and to give existence to something absurd

The basis of this objection is the aspect of infinity in the range of worlds it is possible for God to create. Once one specifies the features of the best world, a better world can be conceived of as possible